mirror of
https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-core.git
synced 2025-02-07 01:59:24 +03:00
MITM: Allow using local received SNI in the outgoing serverName
& verifyPeerCertInNames
https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-core/issues/4348#issuecomment-2637370175 Local received SNI was sent by browser/app. In freedom RAW's `tlsSettings`, set `"serverName": "fromMitm"` to forward it to the real website. In freedom RAW's `tlsSettings`, set `"verifyPeerCertInNames": ["fromMitm"]` to use all possible names to verify the certificate.
This commit is contained in:
parent
9b7841178a
commit
c6a31f457c
@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ const (
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allowedNetworkKey ctx.SessionKey = 9
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handlerSessionKey ctx.SessionKey = 10
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mitmAlpn11Key ctx.SessionKey = 11
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mitmServerNameKey ctx.SessionKey = 12
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)
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func ContextWithInbound(ctx context.Context, inbound *Inbound) context.Context {
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@ -174,3 +175,14 @@ func MitmAlpn11FromContext(ctx context.Context) bool {
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}
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return false
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}
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func ContextWithMitmServerName(ctx context.Context, serverName string) context.Context {
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return context.WithValue(ctx, mitmServerNameKey, serverName)
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}
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func MitmServerNameFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
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if val, ok := ctx.Value(mitmServerNameKey).(string); ok {
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return val
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}
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return ""
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}
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@ -411,6 +411,7 @@ type TLSConfig struct {
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CurvePreferences *StringList `json:"curvePreferences"`
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MasterKeyLog string `json:"masterKeyLog"`
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ServerNameToVerify string `json:"serverNameToVerify"`
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VerifyPeerCertInNames []string `json:"verifyPeerCertInNames"`
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}
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// Build implements Buildable.
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@ -469,10 +470,11 @@ func (c *TLSConfig) Build() (proto.Message, error) {
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}
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config.MasterKeyLog = c.MasterKeyLog
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config.ServerNameToVerify = c.ServerNameToVerify
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if config.ServerNameToVerify != "" && config.Fingerprint == "unsafe" {
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return nil, errors.New(`serverNameToVerify only works with uTLS for now`)
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if c.ServerNameToVerify != "" {
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return nil, errors.PrintRemovedFeatureError("serverNameToVerify", "verifyPeerCertInNames")
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}
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config.VerifyPeerCertInNames = c.VerifyPeerCertInNames
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return config, nil
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}
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@ -64,10 +64,6 @@ func (d *DokodemoDoor) policy() policy.Session {
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return p
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}
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type hasHandshakeAddressContext interface {
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HandshakeAddressContext(ctx context.Context) net.Address
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}
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// Process implements proxy.Inbound.
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func (d *DokodemoDoor) Process(ctx context.Context, network net.Network, conn stat.Connection, dispatcher routing.Dispatcher) error {
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errors.LogDebug(ctx, "processing connection from: ", conn.RemoteAddr())
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@ -87,14 +83,14 @@ func (d *DokodemoDoor) Process(ctx context.Context, network net.Network, conn st
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destinationOverridden = true
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}
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}
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if handshake, ok := conn.(hasHandshakeAddressContext); ok && !destinationOverridden {
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addr := handshake.HandshakeAddressContext(ctx)
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if addr != nil {
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dest.Address = addr
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if conn.(*tls.Conn).ConnectionState().NegotiatedProtocol == "http/1.1" {
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ctx = session.ContextWithMitmAlpn11(ctx, true)
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}
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if tlsConn, ok := conn.(tls.Interface); ok && !destinationOverridden {
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if serverName := tlsConn.HandshakeContextServerName(ctx); serverName != "" {
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dest.Address = net.DomainAddress(serverName)
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destinationOverridden = true
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ctx = session.ContextWithMitmServerName(ctx, serverName)
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}
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if tlsConn.NegotiatedProtocol() == "http/1.1" {
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ctx = session.ContextWithMitmAlpn11(ctx, true)
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}
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}
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}
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@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ import (
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"github.com/xtls/xray-core/transport/internet/tls"
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)
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func IsFromMitm(str string) bool {
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return strings.ToLower(str) == "frommitm"
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}
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// Dial dials a new TCP connection to the given destination.
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func Dial(ctx context.Context, dest net.Destination, streamSettings *internet.MemoryStreamConfig) (stat.Connection, error) {
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errors.LogInfo(ctx, "dialing TCP to ", dest)
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@ -23,11 +27,28 @@ func Dial(ctx context.Context, dest net.Destination, streamSettings *internet.Me
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}
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if config := tls.ConfigFromStreamSettings(streamSettings); config != nil {
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mitmServerName := session.MitmServerNameFromContext(ctx)
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mitmAlpn11 := session.MitmAlpn11FromContext(ctx)
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tlsConfig := config.GetTLSConfig(tls.WithDestination(dest))
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if IsFromMitm(tlsConfig.ServerName) {
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tlsConfig.ServerName = mitmServerName
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}
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if r, ok := tlsConfig.Rand.(*tls.RandCarrier); ok && len(r.VerifyPeerCertInNames) > 0 && IsFromMitm(r.VerifyPeerCertInNames[0]) {
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r.VerifyPeerCertInNames = r.VerifyPeerCertInNames[1:]
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after := mitmServerName
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for {
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if len(after) > 0 {
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r.VerifyPeerCertInNames = append(r.VerifyPeerCertInNames, after)
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}
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_, after, _ = strings.Cut(after, ".")
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if !strings.Contains(after, ".") {
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break
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}
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}
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}
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if fingerprint := tls.GetFingerprint(config.Fingerprint); fingerprint != nil {
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conn = tls.UClient(conn, tlsConfig, fingerprint)
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if len(tlsConfig.NextProtos) == 1 && (tlsConfig.NextProtos[0] == "http/1.1" ||
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(strings.ToLower(tlsConfig.NextProtos[0]) == "frommitm" && session.MitmAlpn11FromContext(ctx))) {
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if len(tlsConfig.NextProtos) == 1 && (tlsConfig.NextProtos[0] == "http/1.1" || (IsFromMitm(tlsConfig.NextProtos[0]) && mitmAlpn11)) {
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if err := conn.(*tls.UConn).WebsocketHandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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@ -37,14 +58,17 @@ func Dial(ctx context.Context, dest net.Destination, streamSettings *internet.Me
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}
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}
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} else {
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if len(tlsConfig.NextProtos) == 1 && strings.ToLower(tlsConfig.NextProtos[0]) == "frommitm" {
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if session.MitmAlpn11FromContext(ctx) {
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tlsConfig.NextProtos = []string{"http/1.1"} // new slice
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if len(tlsConfig.NextProtos) == 1 && IsFromMitm(tlsConfig.NextProtos[0]) {
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if mitmAlpn11 {
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tlsConfig.NextProtos[0] = "http/1.1"
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} else {
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tlsConfig.NextProtos = nil
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}
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}
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conn = tls.Client(conn, tlsConfig)
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if err := conn.(*tls.Conn).HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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} else if config := reality.ConfigFromStreamSettings(streamSettings); config != nil {
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if conn, err = reality.UClient(conn, config, ctx, dest); err != nil {
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@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/base64"
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"os"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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@ -277,10 +278,35 @@ func (c *Config) parseServerName() string {
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return c.ServerName
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}
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func (c *Config) verifyPeerCert(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
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if c.PinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256 != nil {
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func (r *RandCarrier) verifyPeerCert(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
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if r.VerifyPeerCertInNames != nil {
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if len(r.VerifyPeerCertInNames) > 0 {
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certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(rawCerts))
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for i, asn1Data := range rawCerts {
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certs[i], _ = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
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}
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opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
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Roots: r.RootCAs,
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CurrentTime: time.Now(),
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Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
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}
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for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
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opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
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}
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for _, opts.DNSName = range r.VerifyPeerCertInNames {
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if _, err := certs[0].Verify(opts); err == nil {
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return nil
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}
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}
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}
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if r.PinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256 == nil {
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errors.New("peer cert is invalid.")
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}
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}
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if r.PinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256 != nil {
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hashValue := GenerateCertChainHash(rawCerts)
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for _, v := range c.PinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256 {
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for _, v := range r.PinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256 {
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if hmac.Equal(hashValue, v) {
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return nil
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}
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@ -288,11 +314,11 @@ func (c *Config) verifyPeerCert(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Cert
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return errors.New("peer cert is unrecognized: ", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(hashValue))
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}
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if c.PinnedPeerCertificatePublicKeySha256 != nil {
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if r.PinnedPeerCertificatePublicKeySha256 != nil {
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for _, v := range verifiedChains {
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for _, cert := range v {
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publicHash := GenerateCertPublicKeyHash(cert)
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for _, c := range c.PinnedPeerCertificatePublicKeySha256 {
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for _, c := range r.PinnedPeerCertificatePublicKeySha256 {
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if hmac.Equal(publicHash, c) {
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return nil
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}
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@ -305,7 +331,10 @@ func (c *Config) verifyPeerCert(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Cert
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}
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type RandCarrier struct {
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ServerNameToVerify string
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RootCAs *x509.CertPool
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VerifyPeerCertInNames []string
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PinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256 [][]byte
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PinnedPeerCertificatePublicKeySha256 [][]byte
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}
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func (r *RandCarrier) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
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@ -329,16 +358,25 @@ func (c *Config) GetTLSConfig(opts ...Option) *tls.Config {
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}
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}
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randCarrier := &RandCarrier{
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RootCAs: root,
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VerifyPeerCertInNames: slices.Clone(c.VerifyPeerCertInNames),
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PinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256: c.PinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256,
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PinnedPeerCertificatePublicKeySha256: c.PinnedPeerCertificatePublicKeySha256,
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}
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config := &tls.Config{
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Rand: &RandCarrier{
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ServerNameToVerify: c.ServerNameToVerify,
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},
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Rand: randCarrier,
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ClientSessionCache: globalSessionCache,
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RootCAs: root,
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InsecureSkipVerify: c.AllowInsecure,
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NextProtos: c.NextProtocol,
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NextProtos: slices.Clone(c.NextProtocol),
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SessionTicketsDisabled: !c.EnableSessionResumption,
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VerifyPeerCertificate: c.verifyPeerCert,
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VerifyPeerCertificate: randCarrier.verifyPeerCert,
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}
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if len(c.VerifyPeerCertInNames) > 0 {
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config.InsecureSkipVerify = true
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} else {
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randCarrier.VerifyPeerCertInNames = nil
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}
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for _, opt := range opts {
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@ -202,20 +202,21 @@ type Config struct {
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// TLS Client Hello fingerprint (uTLS).
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Fingerprint string `protobuf:"bytes,11,opt,name=fingerprint,proto3" json:"fingerprint,omitempty"`
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RejectUnknownSni bool `protobuf:"varint,12,opt,name=reject_unknown_sni,json=rejectUnknownSni,proto3" json:"reject_unknown_sni,omitempty"`
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// @Document A pinned certificate chain sha256 hash.
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// @Document If the server's hash does not match this value, the connection will be aborted.
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// @Document This value replace allow_insecure.
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// @Document Some certificate chain sha256 hashes.
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// @Document After normal validation or allow_insecure, if the server's cert chain hash does not match any of these values, the connection will be aborted.
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// @Critical
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PinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256 [][]byte `protobuf:"bytes,13,rep,name=pinned_peer_certificate_chain_sha256,json=pinnedPeerCertificateChainSha256,proto3" json:"pinned_peer_certificate_chain_sha256,omitempty"`
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// @Document A pinned certificate public key sha256 hash.
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// @Document If the server's public key hash does not match this value, the connection will be aborted.
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// @Document This value replace allow_insecure.
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// @Document Some certificate public key sha256 hashes.
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// @Document After normal validation (required), if the verified cert's public key hash does not match any of these values, the connection will be aborted.
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// @Critical
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PinnedPeerCertificatePublicKeySha256 [][]byte `protobuf:"bytes,14,rep,name=pinned_peer_certificate_public_key_sha256,json=pinnedPeerCertificatePublicKeySha256,proto3" json:"pinned_peer_certificate_public_key_sha256,omitempty"`
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MasterKeyLog string `protobuf:"bytes,15,opt,name=master_key_log,json=masterKeyLog,proto3" json:"master_key_log,omitempty"`
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// Lists of string as CurvePreferences values.
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CurvePreferences []string `protobuf:"bytes,16,rep,name=curve_preferences,json=curvePreferences,proto3" json:"curve_preferences,omitempty"`
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ServerNameToVerify string `protobuf:"bytes,17,opt,name=server_name_to_verify,json=serverNameToVerify,proto3" json:"server_name_to_verify,omitempty"`
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// @Document Replaces server_name to verify the peer cert.
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// @Document After allow_insecure (automatically), if the server's cert can't be verified by any of these names, pinned_peer_certificate_chain_sha256 will be tried.
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// @Critical
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VerifyPeerCertInNames []string `protobuf:"bytes,17,rep,name=verify_peer_cert_in_names,json=verifyPeerCertInNames,proto3" json:"verify_peer_cert_in_names,omitempty"`
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}
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func (x *Config) Reset() {
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@ -353,11 +354,11 @@ func (x *Config) GetCurvePreferences() []string {
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return nil
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}
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func (x *Config) GetServerNameToVerify() string {
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func (x *Config) GetVerifyPeerCertInNames() []string {
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if x != nil {
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return x.ServerNameToVerify
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return x.VerifyPeerCertInNames
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}
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return ""
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return nil
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}
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var File_transport_internet_tls_config_proto protoreflect.FileDescriptor
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@ -391,7 +392,7 @@ var file_transport_internet_tls_config_proto_rawDesc = []byte{
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||||
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|
||||
0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x50, 0x65, 0x65, 0x72, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x49, 0x6e,
|
||||
0x4e, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x42, 0x73, 0x0a, 0x1f, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x2e, 0x78, 0x72, 0x61,
|
||||
0x79, 0x2e, 0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x74, 0x2e, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65,
|
||||
0x72, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x74, 0x2e, 0x74, 0x6c, 0x73, 0x50, 0x01, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x67, 0x69, 0x74, 0x68,
|
||||
0x75, 0x62, 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x2f, 0x78, 0x74, 0x6c, 0x73, 0x2f, 0x78, 0x72, 0x61, 0x79,
|
||||
0x2d, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x2f, 0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x74, 0x2f,
|
||||
0x69, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x74, 0x2f, 0x74, 0x6c, 0x73, 0xaa, 0x02, 0x1b, 0x58,
|
||||
0x72, 0x61, 0x79, 0x2e, 0x54, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x74, 0x2e, 0x49, 0x6e,
|
||||
0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x74, 0x2e, 0x54, 0x6c, 0x73, 0x62, 0x06, 0x70, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x74,
|
||||
0x6f, 0x33,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
|
@ -69,16 +69,14 @@ message Config {
|
||||
|
||||
bool reject_unknown_sni = 12;
|
||||
|
||||
/* @Document A pinned certificate chain sha256 hash.
|
||||
@Document If the server's hash does not match this value, the connection will be aborted.
|
||||
@Document This value replace allow_insecure.
|
||||
/* @Document Some certificate chain sha256 hashes.
|
||||
@Document After normal validation or allow_insecure, if the server's cert chain hash does not match any of these values, the connection will be aborted.
|
||||
@Critical
|
||||
*/
|
||||
repeated bytes pinned_peer_certificate_chain_sha256 = 13;
|
||||
|
||||
/* @Document A pinned certificate public key sha256 hash.
|
||||
@Document If the server's public key hash does not match this value, the connection will be aborted.
|
||||
@Document This value replace allow_insecure.
|
||||
/* @Document Some certificate public key sha256 hashes.
|
||||
@Document After normal validation (required), if the verified cert's public key hash does not match any of these values, the connection will be aborted.
|
||||
@Critical
|
||||
*/
|
||||
repeated bytes pinned_peer_certificate_public_key_sha256 = 14;
|
||||
@ -88,5 +86,9 @@ message Config {
|
||||
// Lists of string as CurvePreferences values.
|
||||
repeated string curve_preferences = 16;
|
||||
|
||||
string server_name_to_verify = 17;
|
||||
/* @Document Replaces server_name to verify the peer cert.
|
||||
@Document After allow_insecure (automatically), if the server's cert can't be verified by any of these names, pinned_peer_certificate_chain_sha256 will be tried.
|
||||
@Critical
|
||||
*/
|
||||
repeated string verify_peer_cert_in_names = 17;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ type Interface interface {
|
||||
net.Conn
|
||||
HandshakeContext(ctx context.Context) error
|
||||
VerifyHostname(host string) error
|
||||
HandshakeContextServerName(ctx context.Context) string
|
||||
NegotiatedProtocol() string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -43,15 +44,11 @@ func (c *Conn) WriteMultiBuffer(mb buf.MultiBuffer) error {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) HandshakeAddressContext(ctx context.Context) net.Address {
|
||||
func (c *Conn) HandshakeContextServerName(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
if err := c.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
state := c.ConnectionState()
|
||||
if state.ServerName == "" {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return net.ParseAddress(state.ServerName)
|
||||
return c.ConnectionState().ServerName
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Conn) NegotiatedProtocol() string {
|
||||
@ -85,15 +82,11 @@ func (c *UConn) Close() error {
|
||||
return c.Conn.Close()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *UConn) HandshakeAddressContext(ctx context.Context) net.Address {
|
||||
func (c *UConn) HandshakeContextServerName(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
if err := c.HandshakeContext(ctx); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
state := c.ConnectionState()
|
||||
if state.ServerName == "" {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return net.ParseAddress(state.ServerName)
|
||||
return c.ConnectionState().ServerName
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// WebsocketHandshake basically calls UConn.Handshake inside it but it will only send
|
||||
@ -134,17 +127,13 @@ func UClient(c net.Conn, config *tls.Config, fingerprint *utls.ClientHelloID) ne
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func copyConfig(c *tls.Config) *utls.Config {
|
||||
serverNameToVerify := ""
|
||||
if r, ok := c.Rand.(*RandCarrier); ok {
|
||||
serverNameToVerify = r.ServerNameToVerify
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &utls.Config{
|
||||
Rand: c.Rand,
|
||||
RootCAs: c.RootCAs,
|
||||
ServerName: c.ServerName,
|
||||
InsecureSkipVerify: c.InsecureSkipVerify,
|
||||
VerifyPeerCertificate: c.VerifyPeerCertificate,
|
||||
KeyLogWriter: c.KeyLogWriter,
|
||||
InsecureServerNameToVerify: serverNameToVerify,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user