mirror of
https://github.com/klzgrad/naiveproxy.git
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927 lines
32 KiB
C++
927 lines
32 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
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// found in the LICENSE file.
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#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <memory>
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#include <string>
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#include <vector>
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#include "base/base64.h"
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#include "base/logging.h"
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#include "base/macros.h"
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#include "base/numerics/safe_conversions.h"
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#include "base/pickle.h"
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#include "base/stl_util.h"
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#include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
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#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
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#include "base/time/time.h"
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#include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h"
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#include "build/build_config.h"
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#include "crypto/openssl_util.h"
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#include "net/base/ip_address.h"
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#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
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#include "net/base/url_util.h"
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#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
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#include "net/cert/internal/cert_errors.h"
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#include "net/cert/internal/name_constraints.h"
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#include "net/cert/internal/parsed_certificate.h"
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#include "net/cert/internal/signature_algorithm.h"
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#include "net/cert/internal/verify_name_match.h"
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#include "net/cert/internal/verify_signed_data.h"
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#include "net/cert/pem_tokenizer.h"
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#include "net/cert/x509_util.h"
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#include "net/der/parser.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/evp.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/pkcs7.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/pool.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/sha.h"
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#include "url/url_canon.h"
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namespace net {
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namespace {
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// Indicates the order to use when trying to decode binary data, which is
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// based on (speculation) as to what will be most common -> least common
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const X509Certificate::Format kFormatDecodePriority[] = {
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X509Certificate::FORMAT_SINGLE_CERTIFICATE,
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X509Certificate::FORMAT_PKCS7
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};
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// The PEM block header used for DER certificates
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const char kCertificateHeader[] = "CERTIFICATE";
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// The PEM block header used for PKCS#7 data
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const char kPKCS7Header[] = "PKCS7";
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// Utility to split |src| on the first occurrence of |c|, if any. |right| will
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// either be empty if |c| was not found, or will contain the remainder of the
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// string including the split character itself.
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void SplitOnChar(const base::StringPiece& src,
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char c,
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base::StringPiece* left,
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base::StringPiece* right) {
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size_t pos = src.find(c);
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if (pos == base::StringPiece::npos) {
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*left = src;
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right->clear();
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} else {
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*left = src.substr(0, pos);
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*right = src.substr(pos);
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}
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}
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// Converts a GeneralizedTime struct to a base::Time, returning true on success
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// or false if |generalized| was invalid or cannot be represented by
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// base::Time.
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bool GeneralizedTimeToBaseTime(const der::GeneralizedTime& generalized,
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base::Time* result) {
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base::Time::Exploded exploded = {0};
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exploded.year = generalized.year;
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exploded.month = generalized.month;
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exploded.day_of_month = generalized.day;
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exploded.hour = generalized.hours;
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exploded.minute = generalized.minutes;
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exploded.second = generalized.seconds;
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if (base::Time::FromUTCExploded(exploded, result))
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return true;
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// Fail on obviously bad dates.
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if (!exploded.HasValidValues())
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return false;
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// TODO(mattm): consider consolidating this with
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// SaturatedTimeFromUTCExploded from cookie_util.cc
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if (static_cast<int>(generalized.year) > base::Time::kExplodedMaxYear) {
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*result = base::Time::Max();
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return true;
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}
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if (static_cast<int>(generalized.year) < base::Time::kExplodedMinYear) {
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*result = base::Time::Min();
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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// Sets |value| to the Value from a DER Sequence Tag-Length-Value and return
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// true, or return false if the TLV was not a valid DER Sequence.
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WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool GetSequenceValue(const der::Input& tlv,
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der::Input* value) {
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der::Parser parser(tlv);
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return parser.ReadTag(der::kSequence, value) && !parser.HasMore();
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}
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// Normalize |cert|'s Issuer and store it in |out_normalized_issuer|, returning
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// true on success or false if there was a parsing error.
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bool GetNormalizedCertIssuer(CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert,
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std::string* out_normalized_issuer) {
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der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv;
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der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv;
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der::BitString signature_value;
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if (!ParseCertificate(
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der::Input(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert)),
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&tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv, &signature_value,
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nullptr)) {
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return false;
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}
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ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
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if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv,
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x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs,
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nullptr))
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return false;
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der::Input issuer_value;
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if (!GetSequenceValue(tbs.issuer_tlv, &issuer_value))
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return false;
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CertErrors errors;
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return NormalizeName(issuer_value, out_normalized_issuer, &errors);
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}
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// Parses certificates from a PKCS#7 SignedData structure, appending them to
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// |handles|.
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void CreateOSCertHandlesFromPKCS7Bytes(
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const char* data,
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size_t length,
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X509Certificate::OSCertHandles* handles) {
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crypto::EnsureOpenSSLInit();
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crypto::OpenSSLErrStackTracer err_cleaner(FROM_HERE);
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CBS der_data;
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CBS_init(&der_data, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data), length);
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STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)* certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
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if (PKCS7_get_raw_certificates(certs, &der_data,
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x509_util::GetBufferPool())) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs); ++i) {
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handles->push_back(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(certs, i));
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}
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}
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// |handles| took ownership of the individual buffers, so only free the list
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// itself.
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(certs);
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}
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} // namespace
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(
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OSCertHandle cert_handle,
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const OSCertHandles& intermediates) {
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DCHECK(cert_handle);
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
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new X509Certificate(cert_handle, intermediates));
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if (!cert->os_cert_handle())
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return nullptr; // Initialize() failed.
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return cert;
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromHandleUnsafeOptions(
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OSCertHandle cert_handle,
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const OSCertHandles& intermediates,
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UnsafeCreateOptions options) {
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DCHECK(cert_handle);
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
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new X509Certificate(cert_handle, intermediates, options));
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if (!cert->os_cert_handle())
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return nullptr; // Initialize() failed.
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return cert;
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChain(
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const std::vector<base::StringPiece>& der_certs) {
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TRACE_EVENT0("io", "X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChain");
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if (der_certs.empty())
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return NULL;
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X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediate_ca_certs;
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for (size_t i = 1; i < der_certs.size(); i++) {
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OSCertHandle handle = CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes(
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const_cast<char*>(der_certs[i].data()), der_certs[i].size());
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if (!handle)
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break;
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intermediate_ca_certs.push_back(handle);
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}
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OSCertHandle handle = NULL;
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// Return NULL if we failed to parse any of the certs.
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if (der_certs.size() - 1 == intermediate_ca_certs.size()) {
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handle = CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes(
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const_cast<char*>(der_certs[0].data()), der_certs[0].size());
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}
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = nullptr;
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if (handle) {
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cert = CreateFromHandle(handle, intermediate_ca_certs);
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FreeOSCertHandle(handle);
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediate_ca_certs.size(); i++)
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FreeOSCertHandle(intermediate_ca_certs[i]);
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return cert;
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes(
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const char* data,
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size_t length) {
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return CreateFromBytesUnsafeOptions(data, length, {});
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBytesUnsafeOptions(
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const char* data,
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size_t length,
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UnsafeCreateOptions options) {
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OSCertHandle cert_handle = CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes(data, length);
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if (!cert_handle)
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return NULL;
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert =
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CreateFromHandleUnsafeOptions(cert_handle, {}, options);
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FreeOSCertHandle(cert_handle);
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return cert;
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromPickle(
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base::PickleIterator* pickle_iter) {
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int chain_length = 0;
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if (!pickle_iter->ReadLength(&chain_length))
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return nullptr;
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std::vector<base::StringPiece> cert_chain;
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const char* data = nullptr;
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int data_length = 0;
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for (int i = 0; i < chain_length; ++i) {
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if (!pickle_iter->ReadData(&data, &data_length))
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return nullptr;
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cert_chain.push_back(base::StringPiece(data, data_length));
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}
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return CreateFromDERCertChain(cert_chain);
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}
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// static
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CertificateList X509Certificate::CreateCertificateListFromBytes(
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const char* data,
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size_t length,
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int format) {
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OSCertHandles certificates;
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// Check to see if it is in a PEM-encoded form. This check is performed
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// first, as both OS X and NSS will both try to convert if they detect
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// PEM encoding, except they don't do it consistently between the two.
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base::StringPiece data_string(data, length);
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std::vector<std::string> pem_headers;
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// To maintain compatibility with NSS/Firefox, CERTIFICATE is a universally
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// valid PEM block header for any format.
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pem_headers.push_back(kCertificateHeader);
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if (format & FORMAT_PKCS7)
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pem_headers.push_back(kPKCS7Header);
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PEMTokenizer pem_tokenizer(data_string, pem_headers);
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while (pem_tokenizer.GetNext()) {
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std::string decoded(pem_tokenizer.data());
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OSCertHandle handle = NULL;
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if (format & FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE)
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handle = CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes(decoded.c_str(), decoded.size());
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if (handle != NULL) {
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// Parsed a DER encoded certificate. All PEM blocks that follow must
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// also be DER encoded certificates wrapped inside of PEM blocks.
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format = FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE;
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certificates.push_back(handle);
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continue;
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}
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// If the first block failed to parse as a DER certificate, and
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// formats other than PEM are acceptable, check to see if the decoded
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// data is one of the accepted formats.
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if (format & ~FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE) {
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for (size_t i = 0; certificates.empty() &&
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i < arraysize(kFormatDecodePriority); ++i) {
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if (format & kFormatDecodePriority[i]) {
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certificates = CreateOSCertHandlesFromBytes(decoded.c_str(),
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decoded.size(), kFormatDecodePriority[i]);
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}
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}
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}
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// Stop parsing after the first block for any format but a sequence of
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// PEM-encoded DER certificates. The case of FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE
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// is handled above, and continues processing until a certificate fails
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// to parse.
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break;
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}
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// Try each of the formats, in order of parse preference, to see if |data|
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// contains the binary representation of a Format, if it failed to parse
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// as a PEM certificate/chain.
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for (size_t i = 0; certificates.empty() &&
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i < arraysize(kFormatDecodePriority); ++i) {
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if (format & kFormatDecodePriority[i])
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certificates = CreateOSCertHandlesFromBytes(data, length,
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kFormatDecodePriority[i]);
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}
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CertificateList results;
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// No certificates parsed.
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if (certificates.empty())
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return results;
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for (OSCertHandles::iterator it = certificates.begin();
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it != certificates.end(); ++it) {
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert =
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CreateFromHandle(*it, OSCertHandles());
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if (cert)
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results.push_back(std::move(cert));
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FreeOSCertHandle(*it);
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}
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return results;
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}
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void X509Certificate::Persist(base::Pickle* pickle) {
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DCHECK(cert_handle_);
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// This would be an absolutely insane number of intermediates.
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if (intermediate_ca_certs_.size() > static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX) - 1) {
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NOTREACHED();
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return;
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}
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pickle->WriteInt(static_cast<int>(intermediate_ca_certs_.size() + 1));
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pickle->WriteString(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(cert_handle_));
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for (auto* intermediate : intermediate_ca_certs_)
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pickle->WriteString(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(intermediate));
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}
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void X509Certificate::GetDNSNames(std::vector<std::string>* dns_names) const {
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GetSubjectAltName(dns_names, NULL);
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if (dns_names->empty())
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dns_names->push_back(subject_.common_name);
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}
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bool X509Certificate::GetSubjectAltName(
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std::vector<std::string>* dns_names,
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std::vector<std::string>* ip_addrs) const {
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if (dns_names)
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dns_names->clear();
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if (ip_addrs)
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ip_addrs->clear();
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der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv;
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der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv;
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der::BitString signature_value;
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if (!ParseCertificate(der::Input(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_handle_),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_handle_)),
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&tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv,
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&signature_value, nullptr)) {
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return false;
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}
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ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
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if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv,
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x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs,
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nullptr))
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return false;
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if (!tbs.has_extensions)
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return false;
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std::map<der::Input, ParsedExtension> extensions;
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if (!ParseExtensions(tbs.extensions_tlv, &extensions))
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return false;
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ParsedExtension subject_alt_names_extension;
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if (!ConsumeExtension(SubjectAltNameOid(), &extensions,
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&subject_alt_names_extension)) {
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return false;
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}
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CertErrors errors;
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std::unique_ptr<GeneralNames> subject_alt_names =
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GeneralNames::Create(subject_alt_names_extension.value, &errors);
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if (!subject_alt_names)
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return false;
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if (dns_names) {
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for (const auto& dns_name : subject_alt_names->dns_names)
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dns_names->push_back(dns_name.as_string());
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}
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if (ip_addrs) {
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for (const IPAddress& addr : subject_alt_names->ip_addresses) {
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ip_addrs->push_back(
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std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(addr.bytes().data()),
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addr.bytes().size()));
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}
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}
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return !subject_alt_names->dns_names.empty() ||
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!subject_alt_names->ip_addresses.empty();
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}
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bool X509Certificate::HasExpired() const {
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return base::Time::Now() > valid_expiry();
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}
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bool X509Certificate::Equals(const X509Certificate* other) const {
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return IsSameOSCert(cert_handle_, other->cert_handle_);
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}
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bool X509Certificate::IsIssuedByEncoded(
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const std::vector<std::string>& valid_issuers) {
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std::vector<std::string> normalized_issuers;
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CertErrors errors;
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for (const auto& raw_issuer : valid_issuers) {
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der::Input issuer_value;
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std::string normalized_issuer;
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if (!GetSequenceValue(der::Input(&raw_issuer), &issuer_value) ||
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!NormalizeName(issuer_value, &normalized_issuer, &errors)) {
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continue;
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}
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normalized_issuers.push_back(std::move(normalized_issuer));
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}
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std::string normalized_cert_issuer;
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if (!GetNormalizedCertIssuer(cert_handle_, &normalized_cert_issuer))
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return false;
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if (base::ContainsValue(normalized_issuers, normalized_cert_issuer))
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return true;
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for (CRYPTO_BUFFER* intermediate : intermediate_ca_certs_) {
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if (!GetNormalizedCertIssuer(intermediate, &normalized_cert_issuer))
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return false;
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if (base::ContainsValue(normalized_issuers, normalized_cert_issuer))
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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// static
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bool X509Certificate::VerifyHostname(
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const std::string& hostname,
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const std::string& cert_common_name,
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const std::vector<std::string>& cert_san_dns_names,
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const std::vector<std::string>& cert_san_ip_addrs,
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bool allow_common_name_fallback) {
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DCHECK(!hostname.empty());
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// Perform name verification following http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125.
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// The terminology used in this method is as per that RFC:-
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// Reference identifier == the host the local user/agent is intending to
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// access, i.e. the thing displayed in the URL bar.
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// Presented identifier(s) == name(s) the server knows itself as, in its cert.
|
|
|
|
// CanonicalizeHost requires surrounding brackets to parse an IPv6 address.
|
|
const std::string host_or_ip = hostname.find(':') != std::string::npos ?
|
|
"[" + hostname + "]" : hostname;
|
|
url::CanonHostInfo host_info;
|
|
std::string reference_name = CanonicalizeHost(host_or_ip, &host_info);
|
|
// CanonicalizeHost does not normalize absolute vs relative DNS names. If
|
|
// the input name was absolute (included trailing .), normalize it as if it
|
|
// was relative.
|
|
if (!reference_name.empty() && *reference_name.rbegin() == '.')
|
|
reference_name.resize(reference_name.size() - 1);
|
|
if (reference_name.empty())
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (!allow_common_name_fallback && cert_san_dns_names.empty() &&
|
|
cert_san_ip_addrs.empty()) {
|
|
// Common Name matching is not allowed, so fail fast.
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fully handle all cases where |hostname| contains an IP address.
|
|
if (host_info.IsIPAddress()) {
|
|
if (allow_common_name_fallback && cert_san_dns_names.empty() &&
|
|
cert_san_ip_addrs.empty() &&
|
|
host_info.family == url::CanonHostInfo::IPV4) {
|
|
// Fallback to Common name matching. As this is deprecated and only
|
|
// supported for compatibility refuse it for IPv6 addresses.
|
|
return reference_name == cert_common_name;
|
|
}
|
|
base::StringPiece ip_addr_string(
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(host_info.address),
|
|
host_info.AddressLength());
|
|
return base::ContainsValue(cert_san_ip_addrs, ip_addr_string);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// |reference_domain| is the remainder of |host| after the leading host
|
|
// component is stripped off, but includes the leading dot e.g.
|
|
// "www.f.com" -> ".f.com".
|
|
// If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no dots)
|
|
// then |reference_domain| will be empty.
|
|
base::StringPiece reference_host, reference_domain;
|
|
SplitOnChar(reference_name, '.', &reference_host, &reference_domain);
|
|
bool allow_wildcards = false;
|
|
if (!reference_domain.empty()) {
|
|
DCHECK(reference_domain.starts_with("."));
|
|
|
|
// Do not allow wildcards for public/ICANN registry controlled domains -
|
|
// that is, prevent *.com or *.co.uk as valid presented names, but do not
|
|
// prevent *.appspot.com (a private registry controlled domain).
|
|
// In addition, unknown top-level domains (such as 'intranet' domains or
|
|
// new TLDs/gTLDs not yet added to the registry controlled domain dataset)
|
|
// are also implicitly prevented.
|
|
// Because |reference_domain| must contain at least one name component that
|
|
// is not registry controlled, this ensures that all reference domains
|
|
// contain at least three domain components when using wildcards.
|
|
size_t registry_length =
|
|
registry_controlled_domains::GetCanonicalHostRegistryLength(
|
|
reference_name,
|
|
registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
|
|
registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
|
|
|
|
// Because |reference_name| was already canonicalized, the following
|
|
// should never happen.
|
|
CHECK_NE(std::string::npos, registry_length);
|
|
|
|
// Account for the leading dot in |reference_domain|.
|
|
bool is_registry_controlled =
|
|
registry_length != 0 &&
|
|
registry_length == (reference_domain.size() - 1);
|
|
|
|
// Additionally, do not attempt wildcard matching for purely numeric
|
|
// hostnames.
|
|
allow_wildcards =
|
|
!is_registry_controlled &&
|
|
reference_name.find_first_not_of("0123456789.") != std::string::npos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Now step through the DNS names doing wild card comparison (if necessary)
|
|
// on each against the reference name. If subjectAltName is empty, then
|
|
// fallback to use the common name instead.
|
|
std::vector<std::string> common_name_as_vector;
|
|
const std::vector<std::string>* presented_names = &cert_san_dns_names;
|
|
if (allow_common_name_fallback && cert_san_dns_names.empty() &&
|
|
cert_san_ip_addrs.empty()) {
|
|
// Note: there's a small possibility cert_common_name is an international
|
|
// domain name in non-standard encoding (e.g. UTF8String or BMPString
|
|
// instead of A-label). As common name fallback is deprecated we're not
|
|
// doing anything specific to deal with this.
|
|
common_name_as_vector.push_back(cert_common_name);
|
|
presented_names = &common_name_as_vector;
|
|
}
|
|
for (std::vector<std::string>::const_iterator it =
|
|
presented_names->begin();
|
|
it != presented_names->end(); ++it) {
|
|
// Catch badly corrupt cert names up front.
|
|
if (it->empty() || it->find('\0') != std::string::npos) {
|
|
DVLOG(1) << "Bad name in cert: " << *it;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
std::string presented_name(base::ToLowerASCII(*it));
|
|
|
|
// Remove trailing dot, if any.
|
|
if (*presented_name.rbegin() == '.')
|
|
presented_name.resize(presented_name.length() - 1);
|
|
|
|
// The hostname must be at least as long as the cert name it is matching,
|
|
// as we require the wildcard (if present) to match at least one character.
|
|
if (presented_name.length() > reference_name.length())
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
base::StringPiece presented_host, presented_domain;
|
|
SplitOnChar(presented_name, '.', &presented_host, &presented_domain);
|
|
|
|
if (presented_domain != reference_domain)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (presented_host != "*") {
|
|
if (presented_host == reference_host)
|
|
return true;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!allow_wildcards)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool X509Certificate::VerifyNameMatch(const std::string& hostname,
|
|
bool allow_common_name_fallback) const {
|
|
std::vector<std::string> dns_names, ip_addrs;
|
|
GetSubjectAltName(&dns_names, &ip_addrs);
|
|
return VerifyHostname(hostname, subject_.common_name, dns_names, ip_addrs,
|
|
allow_common_name_fallback);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
bool X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle,
|
|
std::string* encoded) {
|
|
if (!cert_handle)
|
|
return false;
|
|
encoded->assign(
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_handle)),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_handle));
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
bool X509Certificate::GetPEMEncodedFromDER(const std::string& der_encoded,
|
|
std::string* pem_encoded) {
|
|
if (der_encoded.empty())
|
|
return false;
|
|
std::string b64_encoded;
|
|
base::Base64Encode(der_encoded, &b64_encoded);
|
|
*pem_encoded = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n";
|
|
|
|
// Divide the Base-64 encoded data into 64-character chunks, as per
|
|
// 4.3.2.4 of RFC 1421.
|
|
static const size_t kChunkSize = 64;
|
|
size_t chunks = (b64_encoded.size() + (kChunkSize - 1)) / kChunkSize;
|
|
for (size_t i = 0, chunk_offset = 0; i < chunks;
|
|
++i, chunk_offset += kChunkSize) {
|
|
pem_encoded->append(b64_encoded, chunk_offset, kChunkSize);
|
|
pem_encoded->append("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
pem_encoded->append("-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n");
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
bool X509Certificate::GetPEMEncoded(OSCertHandle cert_handle,
|
|
std::string* pem_encoded) {
|
|
std::string der_encoded;
|
|
if (!GetDEREncoded(cert_handle, &der_encoded))
|
|
return false;
|
|
return GetPEMEncodedFromDER(der_encoded, pem_encoded);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool X509Certificate::GetPEMEncodedChain(
|
|
std::vector<std::string>* pem_encoded) const {
|
|
std::vector<std::string> encoded_chain;
|
|
std::string pem_data;
|
|
if (!GetPEMEncoded(os_cert_handle(), &pem_data))
|
|
return false;
|
|
encoded_chain.push_back(pem_data);
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediate_ca_certs_.size(); ++i) {
|
|
if (!GetPEMEncoded(intermediate_ca_certs_[i], &pem_data))
|
|
return false;
|
|
encoded_chain.push_back(pem_data);
|
|
}
|
|
pem_encoded->swap(encoded_chain);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
void X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(OSCertHandle cert_handle,
|
|
size_t* size_bits,
|
|
PublicKeyType* type) {
|
|
*type = kPublicKeyTypeUnknown;
|
|
*size_bits = 0;
|
|
|
|
base::StringPiece spki;
|
|
if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(
|
|
base::StringPiece(
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_handle)),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_handle)),
|
|
&spki)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey;
|
|
crypto::OpenSSLErrStackTracer err_tracer(FROM_HERE);
|
|
CBS cbs;
|
|
CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(spki.data()), spki.size());
|
|
pkey.reset(EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs));
|
|
if (!pkey)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
switch (pkey->type) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
*type = kPublicKeyTypeRSA;
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
|
|
*type = kPublicKeyTypeDSA;
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
|
|
*type = kPublicKeyTypeECDSA;
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
|
|
*type = kPublicKeyTypeDH;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
*size_bits = base::saturated_cast<size_t>(EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey.get()));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
bool X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(X509Certificate::OSCertHandle a,
|
|
X509Certificate::OSCertHandle b) {
|
|
DCHECK(a && b);
|
|
if (a == b)
|
|
return true;
|
|
return CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(a) == CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(b) &&
|
|
memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(a), CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(b),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(a)) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
X509Certificate::OSCertHandle X509Certificate::CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes(
|
|
const char* data,
|
|
size_t length) {
|
|
der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv;
|
|
der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv;
|
|
der::BitString signature_value;
|
|
// Do a bare minimum of DER parsing here to make sure the input is not
|
|
// completely crazy. (This is required for at least
|
|
// CreateCertificateListFromBytes with FORMAT_AUTO, if not more.)
|
|
if (!ParseCertificate(
|
|
der::Input(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data), length),
|
|
&tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv, &signature_value,
|
|
nullptr)) {
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data), length,
|
|
x509_util::GetBufferPool());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles X509Certificate::CreateOSCertHandlesFromBytes(
|
|
const char* data,
|
|
size_t length,
|
|
Format format) {
|
|
OSCertHandles results;
|
|
|
|
switch (format) {
|
|
case FORMAT_SINGLE_CERTIFICATE: {
|
|
OSCertHandle handle = CreateOSCertHandleFromBytes(data, length);
|
|
if (handle)
|
|
results.push_back(handle);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case FORMAT_PKCS7: {
|
|
CreateOSCertHandlesFromPKCS7Bytes(data, length, &results);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
default: {
|
|
NOTREACHED() << "Certificate format " << format << " unimplemented";
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return results;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
X509Certificate::OSCertHandle X509Certificate::DupOSCertHandle(
|
|
OSCertHandle cert_handle) {
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert_handle);
|
|
return cert_handle;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
void X509Certificate::FreeOSCertHandle(OSCertHandle cert_handle) {
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert_handle);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
SHA256HashValue X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(OSCertHandle cert) {
|
|
SHA256HashValue sha256;
|
|
|
|
SHA256(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert), sha256.data);
|
|
return sha256;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SHA256HashValue X509Certificate::CalculateChainFingerprint256() const {
|
|
SHA256HashValue sha256;
|
|
memset(sha256.data, 0, sizeof(sha256.data));
|
|
|
|
SHA256_CTX sha256_ctx;
|
|
SHA256_Init(&sha256_ctx);
|
|
SHA256_Update(&sha256_ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_handle_),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_handle_));
|
|
for (CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert : intermediate_ca_certs_) {
|
|
SHA256_Update(&sha256_ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert));
|
|
}
|
|
SHA256_Final(sha256.data, &sha256_ctx);
|
|
|
|
return sha256;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
bool X509Certificate::IsSelfSigned(OSCertHandle cert_handle) {
|
|
der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv;
|
|
der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv;
|
|
der::BitString signature_value;
|
|
if (!ParseCertificate(der::Input(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_handle),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_handle)),
|
|
&tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv,
|
|
&signature_value, nullptr)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
|
|
if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv,
|
|
x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs,
|
|
nullptr)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
der::Input subject_value;
|
|
CertErrors errors;
|
|
std::string normalized_subject;
|
|
if (!GetSequenceValue(tbs.subject_tlv, &subject_value) ||
|
|
!NormalizeName(subject_value, &normalized_subject, &errors)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
der::Input issuer_value;
|
|
std::string normalized_issuer;
|
|
if (!GetSequenceValue(tbs.issuer_tlv, &issuer_value) ||
|
|
!NormalizeName(issuer_value, &normalized_issuer, &errors)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (normalized_subject != normalized_issuer)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
std::unique_ptr<SignatureAlgorithm> signature_algorithm =
|
|
SignatureAlgorithm::Create(signature_algorithm_tlv, nullptr /* errors */);
|
|
if (!signature_algorithm)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
// Don't enforce any minimum key size or restrict the algorithm, since when
|
|
// self signed not very relevant.
|
|
return VerifySignedData(*signature_algorithm, tbs_certificate_tlv,
|
|
signature_value, tbs.spki_tlv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509Certificate::X509Certificate(OSCertHandle cert_handle,
|
|
const OSCertHandles& intermediates)
|
|
: X509Certificate(cert_handle, intermediates, {}) {}
|
|
|
|
X509Certificate::X509Certificate(OSCertHandle cert_handle,
|
|
const OSCertHandles& intermediates,
|
|
UnsafeCreateOptions options)
|
|
: cert_handle_(DupOSCertHandle(cert_handle)) {
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediates.size(); ++i) {
|
|
// Duplicate the incoming certificate, as the caller retains ownership
|
|
// of |intermediates|.
|
|
intermediate_ca_certs_.push_back(DupOSCertHandle(intermediates[i]));
|
|
}
|
|
// Platform-specific initialization.
|
|
if (!Initialize(options) && cert_handle_) {
|
|
// Signal initialization failure by clearing cert_handle_.
|
|
FreeOSCertHandle(cert_handle_);
|
|
cert_handle_ = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509Certificate::~X509Certificate() {
|
|
if (cert_handle_)
|
|
FreeOSCertHandle(cert_handle_);
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediate_ca_certs_.size(); ++i)
|
|
FreeOSCertHandle(intermediate_ca_certs_[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool X509Certificate::Initialize(UnsafeCreateOptions options) {
|
|
der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv;
|
|
der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv;
|
|
der::BitString signature_value;
|
|
|
|
if (!ParseCertificate(der::Input(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_handle_),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_handle_)),
|
|
&tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv,
|
|
&signature_value, nullptr)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
|
|
if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv,
|
|
x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs,
|
|
nullptr))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
CertPrincipal::PrintableStringHandling printable_string_handling =
|
|
options.printable_string_is_utf8
|
|
? CertPrincipal::PrintableStringHandling::kAsUTF8Hack
|
|
: CertPrincipal::PrintableStringHandling::kDefault;
|
|
if (!subject_.ParseDistinguishedName(tbs.subject_tlv.UnsafeData(),
|
|
tbs.subject_tlv.Length(),
|
|
printable_string_handling) ||
|
|
!issuer_.ParseDistinguishedName(tbs.issuer_tlv.UnsafeData(),
|
|
tbs.issuer_tlv.Length(),
|
|
printable_string_handling)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!GeneralizedTimeToBaseTime(tbs.validity_not_before, &valid_start_) ||
|
|
!GeneralizedTimeToBaseTime(tbs.validity_not_after, &valid_expiry_)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
serial_number_ = tbs.serial_number.AsString();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace net
|