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naiveproxy/net/cert/internal/ocsp.cc
klzgrad c677cbe429 Import chromium-70.0.3521.2
2018-08-14 22:19:20 +00:00

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// Copyright 2016 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "net/cert/internal/ocsp.h"
#include <algorithm>
#include "base/base64.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/time/time.h"
#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
#include "net/cert/internal/cert_errors.h"
#include "net/cert/internal/extended_key_usage.h"
#include "net/cert/internal/parsed_certificate.h"
#include "net/cert/internal/verify_name_match.h"
#include "net/cert/internal/verify_signed_data.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_util.h"
#include "net/der/encode_values.h"
#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/bytestring.h"
#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/digest.h"
#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/mem.h"
#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/sha.h"
#include "url/gurl.h"
namespace net {
OCSPCertID::OCSPCertID() = default;
OCSPCertID::~OCSPCertID() = default;
OCSPSingleResponse::OCSPSingleResponse() = default;
OCSPSingleResponse::~OCSPSingleResponse() = default;
OCSPResponseData::OCSPResponseData() = default;
OCSPResponseData::~OCSPResponseData() = default;
OCSPResponse::OCSPResponse() = default;
OCSPResponse::~OCSPResponse() = default;
der::Input BasicOCSPResponseOid() {
// From RFC 6960:
//
// id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
// id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
//
// In dotted notation: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.1
static const uint8_t oid[] = {0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05,
0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x01};
return der::Input(oid);
}
// CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
// hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
// issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
// issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
// serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber
// }
bool ParseOCSPCertID(const der::Input& raw_tlv, OCSPCertID* out) {
der::Parser outer_parser(raw_tlv);
der::Parser parser;
if (!outer_parser.ReadSequence(&parser))
return false;
if (outer_parser.HasMore())
return false;
der::Input sigalg_tlv;
if (!parser.ReadRawTLV(&sigalg_tlv))
return false;
if (!ParseHashAlgorithm(sigalg_tlv, &(out->hash_algorithm)))
return false;
if (!parser.ReadTag(der::kOctetString, &(out->issuer_name_hash)))
return false;
if (!parser.ReadTag(der::kOctetString, &(out->issuer_key_hash)))
return false;
if (!parser.ReadTag(der::kInteger, &(out->serial_number)))
return false;
CertErrors errors;
if (!VerifySerialNumber(out->serial_number, false /*warnings_only*/, &errors))
return false;
return !parser.HasMore();
}
namespace {
// Parses |raw_tlv| to extract an OCSP RevokedInfo (RFC 6960) and stores the
// result in the OCSPCertStatus |out|. Returns whether the parsing was
// successful.
//
// RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
// revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
// revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL
// }
bool ParseRevokedInfo(const der::Input& raw_tlv, OCSPCertStatus* out) {
der::Parser parser(raw_tlv);
if (!parser.ReadGeneralizedTime(&(out->revocation_time)))
return false;
der::Input reason_input;
if (!parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(0), &reason_input,
&(out->has_reason))) {
return false;
}
if (out->has_reason) {
der::Parser reason_parser(reason_input);
der::Input reason_value_input;
uint8_t reason_value;
if (!reason_parser.ReadTag(der::kEnumerated, &reason_value_input))
return false;
if (!der::ParseUint8(reason_value_input, &reason_value))
return false;
if (reason_value >
static_cast<uint8_t>(OCSPCertStatus::RevocationReason::LAST)) {
return false;
}
out->revocation_reason =
static_cast<OCSPCertStatus::RevocationReason>(reason_value);
if (out->revocation_reason == OCSPCertStatus::RevocationReason::UNUSED)
return false;
if (reason_parser.HasMore())
return false;
}
return !parser.HasMore();
}
// Parses |raw_tlv| to extract an OCSP CertStatus (RFC 6960) and stores the
// result in the OCSPCertStatus |out|. Returns whether the parsing was
// successful.
//
// CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
// good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
// revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
// unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo
// }
//
// UnknownInfo ::= NULL
bool ParseCertStatus(const der::Input& raw_tlv, OCSPCertStatus* out) {
der::Parser parser(raw_tlv);
der::Tag status_tag;
der::Input status;
if (!parser.ReadTagAndValue(&status_tag, &status))
return false;
out->has_reason = false;
if (status_tag == der::ContextSpecificPrimitive(0)) {
out->status = OCSPRevocationStatus::GOOD;
} else if (status_tag == der::ContextSpecificConstructed(1)) {
out->status = OCSPRevocationStatus::REVOKED;
if (!ParseRevokedInfo(status, out))
return false;
} else if (status_tag == der::ContextSpecificPrimitive(2)) {
out->status = OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
} else {
return false;
}
return !parser.HasMore();
}
// Writes the hash of |value| as an OCTET STRING to |cbb|, using |hash_type| as
// the algorithm. Returns true on success.
bool AppendHashAsOctetString(const EVP_MD* hash_type,
CBB* cbb,
const der::Input& value) {
CBB octet_string;
unsigned hash_len;
uint8_t hash_buffer[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
return CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &octet_string, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) &&
EVP_Digest(value.UnsafeData(), value.Length(), hash_buffer, &hash_len,
hash_type, nullptr) &&
CBB_add_bytes(&octet_string, hash_buffer, hash_len) && CBB_flush(cbb);
}
} // namespace
// SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
// certID CertID,
// certStatus CertStatus,
// thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
// nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
// singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
// }
bool ParseOCSPSingleResponse(const der::Input& raw_tlv,
OCSPSingleResponse* out) {
der::Parser outer_parser(raw_tlv);
der::Parser parser;
if (!outer_parser.ReadSequence(&parser))
return false;
if (outer_parser.HasMore())
return false;
if (!parser.ReadRawTLV(&(out->cert_id_tlv)))
return false;
der::Input status_tlv;
if (!parser.ReadRawTLV(&status_tlv))
return false;
if (!ParseCertStatus(status_tlv, &(out->cert_status)))
return false;
if (!parser.ReadGeneralizedTime(&(out->this_update)))
return false;
der::Input next_update_input;
if (!parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(0),
&next_update_input, &(out->has_next_update))) {
return false;
}
if (out->has_next_update) {
der::Parser next_update_parser(next_update_input);
if (!next_update_parser.ReadGeneralizedTime(&(out->next_update)))
return false;
if (next_update_parser.HasMore())
return false;
}
if (!parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(1),
&(out->extensions), &(out->has_extensions))) {
return false;
}
return !parser.HasMore();
}
namespace {
// Parses |raw_tlv| to extract a ResponderID (RFC 6960) and stores the
// result in the ResponderID |out|. Returns whether the parsing was successful.
//
// ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
// byName [1] Name,
// byKey [2] KeyHash
// }
bool ParseResponderID(const der::Input& raw_tlv,
OCSPResponseData::ResponderID* out) {
der::Parser parser(raw_tlv);
der::Tag id_tag;
der::Input id_input;
if (!parser.ReadTagAndValue(&id_tag, &id_input))
return false;
if (id_tag == der::ContextSpecificConstructed(1)) {
out->type = OCSPResponseData::ResponderType::NAME;
out->name = id_input;
} else if (id_tag == der::ContextSpecificConstructed(2)) {
der::Parser key_parser(id_input);
der::Input key_hash;
if (!key_parser.ReadTag(der::kOctetString, &key_hash))
return false;
if (key_parser.HasMore())
return false;
if (key_hash.Length() != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
return false;
out->type = OCSPResponseData::ResponderType::KEY_HASH;
out->key_hash = key_hash;
} else {
return false;
}
return !parser.HasMore();
}
} // namespace
// ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
// version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
// responderID ResponderID,
// producedAt GeneralizedTime,
// responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
// responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
// }
bool ParseOCSPResponseData(const der::Input& raw_tlv, OCSPResponseData* out) {
der::Parser outer_parser(raw_tlv);
der::Parser parser;
if (!outer_parser.ReadSequence(&parser))
return false;
if (outer_parser.HasMore())
return false;
der::Input version_input;
bool version_present;
if (!parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(0),
&version_input, &version_present)) {
return false;
}
// For compatibilty, we ignore the restriction from X.690 Section 11.5 that
// DEFAULT values should be omitted for values equal to the default value.
// TODO: Add warning about non-strict parsing.
if (version_present) {
der::Parser version_parser(version_input);
if (!version_parser.ReadUint8(&(out->version)))
return false;
if (version_parser.HasMore())
return false;
} else {
out->version = 0;
}
if (out->version != 0)
return false;
der::Input responder_input;
if (!parser.ReadRawTLV(&responder_input))
return false;
if (!ParseResponderID(responder_input, &(out->responder_id)))
return false;
if (!parser.ReadGeneralizedTime(&(out->produced_at)))
return false;
der::Parser responses_parser;
if (!parser.ReadSequence(&responses_parser))
return false;
out->responses.clear();
while (responses_parser.HasMore()) {
der::Input single_response;
if (!responses_parser.ReadRawTLV(&single_response))
return false;
out->responses.push_back(single_response);
}
if (!parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(1),
&(out->extensions), &(out->has_extensions))) {
return false;
}
return !parser.HasMore();
}
namespace {
// Parses |raw_tlv| to extract a BasicOCSPResponse (RFC 6960) and stores the
// result in the OCSPResponse |out|. Returns whether the parsing was
// successful.
//
// BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
// tbsResponseData ResponseData,
// signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
// signature BIT STRING,
// certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL
// }
bool ParseBasicOCSPResponse(const der::Input& raw_tlv, OCSPResponse* out) {
der::Parser outer_parser(raw_tlv);
der::Parser parser;
if (!outer_parser.ReadSequence(&parser))
return false;
if (outer_parser.HasMore())
return false;
if (!parser.ReadRawTLV(&(out->data)))
return false;
der::Input sigalg_tlv;
if (!parser.ReadRawTLV(&sigalg_tlv))
return false;
// TODO(crbug.com/634443): Propagate the errors.
CertErrors errors;
out->signature_algorithm = SignatureAlgorithm::Create(sigalg_tlv, &errors);
if (!out->signature_algorithm)
return false;
if (!parser.ReadBitString(&(out->signature)))
return false;
der::Input certs_input;
if (!parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(0), &certs_input,
&(out->has_certs))) {
return false;
}
out->certs.clear();
if (out->has_certs) {
der::Parser certs_seq_parser(certs_input);
der::Parser certs_parser;
if (!certs_seq_parser.ReadSequence(&certs_parser))
return false;
if (certs_seq_parser.HasMore())
return false;
while (certs_parser.HasMore()) {
der::Input cert_tlv;
if (!certs_parser.ReadRawTLV(&cert_tlv))
return false;
out->certs.push_back(cert_tlv);
}
}
return !parser.HasMore();
}
} // namespace
// OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
// responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
// responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL
// }
//
// ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
// responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
// response OCTET STRING
// }
bool ParseOCSPResponse(const der::Input& raw_tlv, OCSPResponse* out) {
der::Parser outer_parser(raw_tlv);
der::Parser parser;
if (!outer_parser.ReadSequence(&parser))
return false;
if (outer_parser.HasMore())
return false;
der::Input response_status_input;
uint8_t response_status;
if (!parser.ReadTag(der::kEnumerated, &response_status_input))
return false;
if (!der::ParseUint8(response_status_input, &response_status))
return false;
if (response_status >
static_cast<uint8_t>(OCSPResponse::ResponseStatus::LAST)) {
return false;
}
out->status = static_cast<OCSPResponse::ResponseStatus>(response_status);
if (out->status == OCSPResponse::ResponseStatus::UNUSED)
return false;
if (out->status == OCSPResponse::ResponseStatus::SUCCESSFUL) {
der::Parser outer_bytes_parser;
der::Parser bytes_parser;
if (!parser.ReadConstructed(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(0),
&outer_bytes_parser)) {
return false;
}
if (!outer_bytes_parser.ReadSequence(&bytes_parser))
return false;
if (outer_bytes_parser.HasMore())
return false;
der::Input type_oid;
if (!bytes_parser.ReadTag(der::kOid, &type_oid))
return false;
if (type_oid != BasicOCSPResponseOid())
return false;
// As per RFC 6960 Section 4.2.1, the value of |response| SHALL be the DER
// encoding of BasicOCSPResponse.
der::Input response;
if (!bytes_parser.ReadTag(der::kOctetString, &response))
return false;
if (!ParseBasicOCSPResponse(response, out))
return false;
if (bytes_parser.HasMore())
return false;
}
return !parser.HasMore();
}
namespace {
// Checks that the |type| hash of |value| is equal to |hash|
bool VerifyHash(const EVP_MD* type,
const der::Input& hash,
const der::Input& value) {
unsigned value_hash_len;
uint8_t value_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!EVP_Digest(value.UnsafeData(), value.Length(), value_hash,
&value_hash_len, type, nullptr)) {
return false;
}
return hash == der::Input(value_hash, value_hash_len);
}
// Extracts the bytes of the SubjectPublicKey bit string given an SPKI. That is
// to say, the value of subjectPublicKey without the leading unused bit
// count octet.
//
// Returns true on success and fills |*spk_tlv| with the result.
//
// SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
// algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
// subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
// }
bool GetSubjectPublicKeyBytes(const der::Input& spki_tlv, der::Input* spk_tlv) {
base::StringPiece spk_strpiece;
if (!asn1::ExtractSubjectPublicKeyFromSPKI(spki_tlv.AsStringPiece(),
&spk_strpiece)) {
return false;
}
// ExtractSubjectPublicKeyFromSPKI() includes the unused bit count. For this
// application, the unused bit count must be zero, and is not included in the
// result.
if (!spk_strpiece.starts_with("\0"))
return false;
spk_strpiece.remove_prefix(1);
*spk_tlv = der::Input(spk_strpiece);
return true;
}
// Checks the OCSPCertID |id| identifies |certificate|.
bool CheckCertIDMatchesCertificate(
const OCSPCertID& id,
const ParsedCertificate* certificate,
const ParsedCertificate* issuer_certificate) {
const EVP_MD* type = nullptr;
switch (id.hash_algorithm) {
case DigestAlgorithm::Md2:
case DigestAlgorithm::Md4:
case DigestAlgorithm::Md5:
// Unsupported.
return false;
case DigestAlgorithm::Sha1:
type = EVP_sha1();
break;
case DigestAlgorithm::Sha256:
type = EVP_sha256();
break;
case DigestAlgorithm::Sha384:
type = EVP_sha384();
break;
case DigestAlgorithm::Sha512:
type = EVP_sha512();
break;
}
if (!VerifyHash(type, id.issuer_name_hash, certificate->tbs().issuer_tlv))
return false;
der::Input key_tlv;
if (!GetSubjectPublicKeyBytes(issuer_certificate->tbs().spki_tlv, &key_tlv))
return false;
if (!VerifyHash(type, id.issuer_key_hash, key_tlv))
return false;
return id.serial_number == certificate->tbs().serial_number;
}
// TODO(eroman): Revisit how certificate parsing is used by this file. Ideally
// would either pass in the parsed bits, or have a better abstraction for lazily
// parsing.
scoped_refptr<ParsedCertificate> OCSPParseCertificate(base::StringPiece der) {
ParseCertificateOptions parse_options;
parse_options.allow_invalid_serial_numbers = true;
// TODO(eroman): Swallows the parsing errors. However uses a permissive
// parsing model.
CertErrors errors;
return ParsedCertificate::Create(
x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(der.data()), der.size()),
{}, &errors);
}
// Checks that the ResponderID |id| matches the certificate |cert| either
// by verifying the name matches that of the certificate or that the hash
// matches the certificate's public key hash (RFC 6960, 4.2.2.3).
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool CheckResponderIDMatchesCertificate(
const OCSPResponseData::ResponderID& id,
const ParsedCertificate* cert) {
switch (id.type) {
case OCSPResponseData::ResponderType::NAME: {
der::Input name_rdn;
der::Input cert_rdn;
if (!der::Parser(id.name).ReadTag(der::kSequence, &name_rdn) ||
!der::Parser(cert->tbs().subject_tlv)
.ReadTag(der::kSequence, &cert_rdn))
return false;
return VerifyNameMatch(name_rdn, cert_rdn);
}
case OCSPResponseData::ResponderType::KEY_HASH: {
der::Input key;
if (!GetSubjectPublicKeyBytes(cert->tbs().spki_tlv, &key))
return false;
return VerifyHash(EVP_sha1(), id.key_hash, key);
}
}
return false;
}
// Verifies that |responder_certificate| has been authority for OCSP signing,
// delegated to it by |issuer_certificate|.
//
// TODO(eroman): No revocation checks are done (see id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck in the
// spec). extension).
//
// TODO(eroman): Not all properties of the certificate are verified, only the
// signature and EKU. Can full RFC 5280 validation be used, or are there
// compatibility concerns?
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifyAuthorizedResponderCert(
const ParsedCertificate* responder_certificate,
const ParsedCertificate* issuer_certificate) {
// The Authorized Responder must be directly signed by the issuer of the
// certificate being checked.
// TODO(eroman): Must check the signature algorithm against policy.
if (!VerifySignedData(responder_certificate->signature_algorithm(),
responder_certificate->tbs_certificate_tlv(),
responder_certificate->signature_value(),
issuer_certificate->tbs().spki_tlv)) {
return false;
}
// The Authorized Responder must include the value id-kp-OCSPSigning as
// part of the extended key usage extension.
if (!responder_certificate->has_extended_key_usage())
return false;
const std::vector<der::Input>& ekus =
responder_certificate->extended_key_usage();
if (std::find(ekus.begin(), ekus.end(), OCSPSigning()) == ekus.end())
return false;
return true;
}
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifyOCSPResponseSignatureGivenCert(
const OCSPResponse& response,
const ParsedCertificate* cert) {
// TODO(eroman): Must check the signature algorithm against policy.
return VerifySignedData(*(response.signature_algorithm), response.data,
response.signature, cert->tbs().spki_tlv);
}
// Verifies that the OCSP response has a valid signature using
// |issuer_certificate|, or an authorized responder issued by
// |issuer_certificate| for OCSP signing.
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool VerifyOCSPResponseSignature(
const OCSPResponse& response,
const OCSPResponseData& response_data,
const ParsedCertificate* issuer_certificate) {
// In order to verify the OCSP signature, a valid responder matching the OCSP
// Responder ID must be located (RFC 6960, 4.2.2.2). The responder is allowed
// to be either the certificate issuer or a delegated authority directly
// signed by the issuer.
if (CheckResponderIDMatchesCertificate(response_data.responder_id,
issuer_certificate) &&
VerifyOCSPResponseSignatureGivenCert(response, issuer_certificate)) {
return true;
}
// Otherwise search through the provided certificates for the Authorized
// Responder. Want a certificate that:
// (1) Matches the OCSP Responder ID.
// (2) Has been given authority for OCSP signing by |issuer_certificate|.
// (3) Has signed the OCSP response using its public key.
for (const auto& responder_cert_tlv : response.certs) {
scoped_refptr<ParsedCertificate> cur_responder_certificate =
OCSPParseCertificate(responder_cert_tlv.AsStringPiece());
// If failed parsing the certificate, keep looking.
if (!cur_responder_certificate)
continue;
// If the certificate doesn't match the OCSP's responder ID, keep looking.
if (!CheckResponderIDMatchesCertificate(response_data.responder_id,
cur_responder_certificate.get())) {
continue;
}
// If the certificate isn't a valid Authorized Responder certificate, keep
// looking.
if (!VerifyAuthorizedResponderCert(cur_responder_certificate.get(),
issuer_certificate)) {
continue;
}
// If the certificate signed this OCSP response, have found a match.
// Otherwise keep looking.
if (VerifyOCSPResponseSignatureGivenCert(response,
cur_responder_certificate.get())) {
return true;
}
}
// Failed to confirm the validity of the OCSP signature using any of the
// candidate certificates.
return false;
}
// Loops through the OCSPSingleResponses to find the best match for |cert|.
OCSPRevocationStatus GetRevocationStatusForCert(
const OCSPResponseData& response_data,
const ParsedCertificate* cert,
const ParsedCertificate* issuer_certificate,
const base::Time& verify_time,
const base::TimeDelta& max_age,
OCSPVerifyResult::ResponseStatus* response_details) {
OCSPRevocationStatus result = OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::NO_MATCHING_RESPONSE;
for (const auto& single_response_der : response_data.responses) {
// In the common case, there should only be one SingleResponse in the
// ResponseData (matching the certificate requested and used on this
// connection). However, it is possible for the OCSP responder to provide
// multiple responses for multiple certificates. Look through all the
// provided SingleResponses, and check to see if any match the
// certificate. A SingleResponse matches a certificate if it has the same
// serial number, issuer name (hash), and issuer public key (hash).
OCSPSingleResponse single_response;
if (!ParseOCSPSingleResponse(single_response_der, &single_response))
return OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
OCSPCertID cert_id;
if (!ParseOCSPCertID(single_response.cert_id_tlv, &cert_id))
return OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
if (!CheckCertIDMatchesCertificate(cert_id, cert, issuer_certificate))
continue;
// The SingleResponse matches the certificate, but may be out of date. Out
// of date responses are noted seperate from responses with mismatched
// serial numbers. If an OCSP responder provides both an up to date
// response and an expired response, the up to date response takes
// precedence (PROVIDED > INVALID_DATE).
if (!CheckOCSPDateValid(single_response, verify_time, max_age)) {
if (*response_details != OCSPVerifyResult::PROVIDED)
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::INVALID_DATE;
continue;
}
// In the case with multiple matching and up to date responses, keep only
// the strictest status (REVOKED > UNKNOWN > GOOD).
if (*response_details != OCSPVerifyResult::PROVIDED ||
result == OCSPRevocationStatus::GOOD ||
single_response.cert_status.status == OCSPRevocationStatus::REVOKED) {
result = single_response.cert_status.status;
}
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::PROVIDED;
}
return result;
}
} // namespace
OCSPRevocationStatus CheckOCSP(
base::StringPiece raw_response,
base::StringPiece certificate_der,
base::StringPiece issuer_certificate_der,
const base::Time& verify_time,
const base::TimeDelta& max_age,
OCSPVerifyResult::ResponseStatus* response_details) {
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::NOT_CHECKED;
if (raw_response.empty()) {
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::MISSING;
return OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
}
der::Input response_der(raw_response);
OCSPResponse response;
if (!ParseOCSPResponse(response_der, &response)) {
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::PARSE_RESPONSE_ERROR;
return OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
}
// RFC 6960 defines all responses |response_status| != SUCCESSFUL as error
// responses. No revocation information is provided on error responses, and
// the OCSPResponseData structure is not set.
if (response.status != OCSPResponse::ResponseStatus::SUCCESSFUL) {
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::ERROR_RESPONSE;
return OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
}
// Actual revocation information is contained within the BasicOCSPResponse as
// a ResponseData structure. The BasicOCSPResponse was parsed above, and
// contains an unparsed ResponseData. From RFC 6960:
//
// BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
// tbsResponseData ResponseData,
// signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
// signature BIT STRING,
// certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
//
// ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
// version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
// responderID ResponderID,
// producedAt GeneralizedTime,
// responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
// responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
OCSPResponseData response_data;
if (!ParseOCSPResponseData(response.data, &response_data)) {
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::PARSE_RESPONSE_DATA_ERROR;
return OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
}
scoped_refptr<ParsedCertificate> certificate =
OCSPParseCertificate(certificate_der);
scoped_refptr<ParsedCertificate> issuer_certificate =
OCSPParseCertificate(issuer_certificate_der);
if (!certificate || !issuer_certificate) {
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::NOT_CHECKED;
return OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
}
// If producedAt is outside of the certificate validity period, reject the
// response.
if (response_data.produced_at < certificate->tbs().validity_not_before ||
response_data.produced_at > certificate->tbs().validity_not_after) {
*response_details = OCSPVerifyResult::BAD_PRODUCED_AT;
return OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
}
// Look through all of the OCSPSingleResponses for a match (based on CertID
// and time).
OCSPRevocationStatus status = GetRevocationStatusForCert(
response_data, certificate.get(), issuer_certificate.get(), verify_time,
max_age, response_details);
// TODO(eroman): Process the OCSP extensions. In particular, must reject if
// there are any critical extensions that are not understood.
// Check that the OCSP response has a valid signature. It must either be
// signed directly by the issuing certificate, or a valid authorized
// responder.
if (!VerifyOCSPResponseSignature(response, response_data,
issuer_certificate.get())) {
return OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN;
}
return status;
}
bool CheckOCSPDateValid(const OCSPSingleResponse& response,
const base::Time& verify_time,
const base::TimeDelta& max_age) {
der::GeneralizedTime verify_time_der;
if (!der::EncodeTimeAsGeneralizedTime(verify_time, &verify_time_der))
return false;
if (response.this_update > verify_time_der)
return false; // Response is not yet valid.
if (response.has_next_update && (response.next_update <= verify_time_der))
return false; // Response is no longer valid.
der::GeneralizedTime earliest_this_update;
if (!der::EncodeTimeAsGeneralizedTime(verify_time - max_age,
&earliest_this_update)) {
return false;
}
if (response.this_update < earliest_this_update)
return false; // Response is too old.
return true;
}
bool CreateOCSPRequest(const ParsedCertificate* cert,
const ParsedCertificate* issuer,
std::vector<uint8_t>* request_der) {
request_der->clear();
bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
// This initial buffer size is big enough for 20 octet long serial numbers
// (upper bound from RFC 5280) and then a handful of extra bytes. This
// number doesn't matter for correctness.
const size_t kInitialBufferSize = 100;
if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), kInitialBufferSize))
return false;
// OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
// tbsRequest TBSRequest,
// optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
//
// TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
// version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
// requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
// requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
// requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
CBB ocsp_request;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb.get(), &ocsp_request, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
return false;
CBB tbs_request;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&ocsp_request, &tbs_request, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
return false;
// "version", "requestorName", and "requestExtensions" are omitted.
CBB request_list;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&tbs_request, &request_list, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
return false;
CBB request;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&request_list, &request, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
return false;
// Request ::= SEQUENCE {
// reqCert CertID,
// singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
CBB req_cert;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&request, &req_cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
return false;
// CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
// hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
// issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
// issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
// serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
// TODO(eroman): Don't use SHA1.
const EVP_MD* md = EVP_sha1();
if (!EVP_marshal_digest_algorithm(&req_cert, md))
return false;
AppendHashAsOctetString(md, &req_cert, issuer->tbs().subject_tlv);
der::Input key_tlv;
if (!GetSubjectPublicKeyBytes(issuer->tbs().spki_tlv, &key_tlv))
return false;
AppendHashAsOctetString(md, &req_cert, key_tlv);
CBB serial_number;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&req_cert, &serial_number, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER))
return false;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&serial_number, cert->tbs().serial_number.UnsafeData(),
cert->tbs().serial_number.Length())) {
return false;
}
uint8_t* result_bytes;
size_t result_bytes_length;
if (!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &result_bytes, &result_bytes_length))
return false;
bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> delete_tbs_cert_bytes(result_bytes);
request_der->assign(result_bytes, result_bytes + result_bytes_length);
return true;
}
// From RFC 2560 section A.1.1:
//
// An OCSP request using the GET method is constructed as follows:
//
// GET {url}/{url-encoding of base-64 encoding of the DER encoding of
// the OCSPRequest}
GURL CreateOCSPGetURL(const ParsedCertificate* cert,
const ParsedCertificate* issuer,
base::StringPiece ocsp_responder_url) {
std::vector<uint8_t> ocsp_request_der;
if (!CreateOCSPRequest(cert, issuer, &ocsp_request_der)) {
// Unexpected (means BoringSSL failed an operation).
return GURL();
}
// Base64 encode the request data.
std::string b64_encoded;
base::Base64Encode(
base::StringPiece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ocsp_request_der.data()),
ocsp_request_der.size()),
&b64_encoded);
// In theory +, /, and = are valid in paths and don't need to be escaped.
// However from the example in RFC 5019 section 5 it is clear that the intent
// is to escape non-alphanumeric characters (the example conclusively escapes
// '/' and '=', but doesn't clarify '+').
base::ReplaceSubstringsAfterOffset(&b64_encoded, 0, "+", "%2B");
base::ReplaceSubstringsAfterOffset(&b64_encoded, 0, "/", "%2F");
base::ReplaceSubstringsAfterOffset(&b64_encoded, 0, "=", "%3D");
// No attempt is made to collapse double slashes for URLs that end in slash,
// since the spec doesn't do that.
return GURL(std::string(ocsp_responder_url) + "/" + b64_encoded);
}
} // namespace net
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