mirror of
https://github.com/klzgrad/naiveproxy.git
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770 lines
27 KiB
C++
770 lines
27 KiB
C++
// Copyright 2012 The Chromium Authors
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
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// found in the LICENSE file.
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#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <memory>
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#include <string>
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#include <string_view>
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#include <vector>
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#include "base/containers/contains.h"
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#include "base/containers/span.h"
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#include "base/logging.h"
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#include "base/notreached.h"
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#include "base/numerics/safe_conversions.h"
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#include "base/pickle.h"
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#include "base/strings/strcat.h"
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#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
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#include "base/time/time.h"
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#include "crypto/openssl_util.h"
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#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
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#include "net/base/tracing.h"
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#include "net/base/url_util.h"
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#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
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#include "net/cert/time_conversions.h"
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#include "net/cert/x509_util.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/evp.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/pool.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/sha.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/pki/cert_errors.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/pki/name_constraints.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/pki/parsed_certificate.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/pki/parser.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/pki/pem.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/pki/signature_algorithm.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/pki/verify_certificate_chain.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/pki/verify_name_match.h"
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#include "third_party/boringssl/src/pki/verify_signed_data.h"
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#include "url/url_canon.h"
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namespace net {
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namespace {
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// Indicates the order to use when trying to decode binary data, which is
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// based on (speculation) as to what will be most common -> least common
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constexpr auto kFormatDecodePriority = std::to_array<X509Certificate::Format>(
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{X509Certificate::FORMAT_SINGLE_CERTIFICATE,
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X509Certificate::FORMAT_PKCS7});
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// The PEM block header used for DER certificates
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const char kCertificateHeader[] = "CERTIFICATE";
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// The PEM block header used for PKCS#7 data
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const char kPKCS7Header[] = "PKCS7";
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// Utility to split |src| on the first occurrence of |c|, if any. |right| will
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// either be empty if |c| was not found, or will contain the remainder of the
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// string including the split character itself.
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void SplitOnChar(std::string_view src,
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char c,
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std::string_view* left,
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std::string_view* right) {
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size_t pos = src.find(c);
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if (pos == std::string_view::npos) {
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*left = src;
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*right = std::string_view();
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} else {
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*left = src.substr(0, pos);
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*right = src.substr(pos);
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}
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}
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// Sets |value| to the Value from a DER Sequence Tag-Length-Value and return
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// true, or return false if the TLV was not a valid DER Sequence.
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[[nodiscard]] bool ParseSequenceValue(const bssl::der::Input& tlv,
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bssl::der::Input* value) {
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bssl::der::Parser parser(tlv);
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return parser.ReadTag(CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE, value) && !parser.HasMore();
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}
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// Normalize |cert|'s Issuer and store it in |out_normalized_issuer|, returning
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// true on success or false if there was a parsing error.
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bool GetNormalizedCertIssuer(CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert,
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std::string* out_normalized_issuer) {
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bssl::der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv;
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bssl::der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv;
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bssl::der::BitString signature_value;
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if (!bssl::ParseCertificate(
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bssl::der::Input(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsSpan(cert)),
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&tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv, &signature_value,
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nullptr)) {
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return false;
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}
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bssl::ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
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if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv,
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x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs,
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nullptr))
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return false;
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bssl::der::Input issuer_value;
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if (!ParseSequenceValue(tbs.issuer_tlv, &issuer_value))
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return false;
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bssl::CertErrors errors;
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return NormalizeName(issuer_value, out_normalized_issuer, &errors);
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}
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bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> CreateCertBufferFromBytesWithSanityCheck(
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base::span<const uint8_t> data) {
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bssl::der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv;
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bssl::der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv;
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bssl::der::BitString signature_value;
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// Do a bare minimum of DER parsing here to see if the input looks
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// certificate-ish.
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if (!bssl::ParseCertificate(bssl::der::Input(data), &tbs_certificate_tlv,
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&signature_algorithm_tlv, &signature_value,
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nullptr)) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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return x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(data);
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}
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} // namespace
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
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bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> cert_buffer,
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std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates) {
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return CreateFromBufferUnsafeOptions(std::move(cert_buffer),
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std::move(intermediates), {});
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBufferUnsafeOptions(
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bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> cert_buffer,
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std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates,
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UnsafeCreateOptions options) {
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DCHECK(cert_buffer);
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ParsedFields parsed;
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if (!parsed.Initialize(cert_buffer.get(), options)) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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return base::WrapRefCounted(new X509Certificate(
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std::move(parsed), std::move(cert_buffer), std::move(intermediates)));
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChain(
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const std::vector<std::string_view>& der_certs) {
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return CreateFromDERCertChainUnsafeOptions(der_certs, {});
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate>
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X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChainUnsafeOptions(
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const std::vector<std::string_view>& der_certs,
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UnsafeCreateOptions options) {
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TRACE_EVENT0("io", "X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChain");
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if (der_certs.empty())
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return nullptr;
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std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediate_ca_certs;
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intermediate_ca_certs.reserve(der_certs.size() - 1);
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for (size_t i = 1; i < der_certs.size(); i++) {
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intermediate_ca_certs.push_back(
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x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(der_certs[i]));
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}
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return CreateFromBufferUnsafeOptions(
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x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(der_certs[0]),
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std::move(intermediate_ca_certs), options);
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes(
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base::span<const uint8_t> data) {
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return CreateFromBytesUnsafeOptions(data, {});
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBytesUnsafeOptions(
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base::span<const uint8_t> data,
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UnsafeCreateOptions options) {
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateFromBufferUnsafeOptions(
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x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(data), {}, options);
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return cert;
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromPickle(
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base::PickleIterator* pickle_iter) {
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return CreateFromPickleUnsafeOptions(pickle_iter, {});
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}
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// static
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromPickleUnsafeOptions(
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base::PickleIterator* pickle_iter,
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UnsafeCreateOptions options) {
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size_t chain_length = 0;
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if (!pickle_iter->ReadLength(&chain_length))
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return nullptr;
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std::vector<std::string_view> cert_chain;
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const char* data = nullptr;
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size_t data_length = 0;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < chain_length; ++i) {
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if (!pickle_iter->ReadData(&data, &data_length))
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return nullptr;
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cert_chain.emplace_back(data, data_length);
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}
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return CreateFromDERCertChainUnsafeOptions(cert_chain, options);
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}
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// static
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CertificateList X509Certificate::CreateCertificateListFromBytes(
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base::span<const uint8_t> data,
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int format) {
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std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> certificates;
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// Check to see if it is in a PEM-encoded form. This check is performed
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// first, as both OS X and NSS will both try to convert if they detect
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// PEM encoding, except they don't do it consistently between the two.
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std::vector<std::string> pem_headers;
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// To maintain compatibility with NSS/Firefox, CERTIFICATE is a universally
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// valid PEM block header for any format.
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pem_headers.push_back(kCertificateHeader);
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if (format & FORMAT_PKCS7)
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pem_headers.push_back(kPKCS7Header);
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bssl::PEMTokenizer pem_tokenizer(base::as_string_view(data), pem_headers);
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while (pem_tokenizer.GetNext()) {
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std::string decoded(pem_tokenizer.data());
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bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> handle;
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if (format & FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE) {
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handle =
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CreateCertBufferFromBytesWithSanityCheck(base::as_byte_span(decoded));
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}
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if (handle) {
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// Parsed a DER encoded certificate. All PEM blocks that follow must
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// also be DER encoded certificates wrapped inside of PEM blocks.
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format = FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE;
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certificates.push_back(std::move(handle));
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continue;
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}
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// If the first block failed to parse as a DER certificate, and
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// formats other than PEM are acceptable, check to see if the decoded
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// data is one of the accepted formats.
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if (format & ~FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE) {
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for (size_t i = 0;
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certificates.empty() && i < std::size(kFormatDecodePriority); ++i) {
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if (format & kFormatDecodePriority[i]) {
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certificates = CreateCertBuffersFromBytes(base::as_byte_span(decoded),
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kFormatDecodePriority[i]);
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}
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}
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}
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// Stop parsing after the first block for any format but a sequence of
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// PEM-encoded DER certificates. The case of FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE
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// is handled above, and continues processing until a certificate fails
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// to parse.
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break;
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}
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// Try each of the formats, in order of parse preference, to see if |data|
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// contains the binary representation of a Format, if it failed to parse
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// as a PEM certificate/chain.
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for (size_t i = 0;
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certificates.empty() && i < std::size(kFormatDecodePriority); ++i) {
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if (format & kFormatDecodePriority[i])
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certificates = CreateCertBuffersFromBytes(data, kFormatDecodePriority[i]);
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}
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CertificateList results;
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// No certificates parsed.
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if (certificates.empty())
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return results;
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for (auto& it : certificates) {
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateFromBuffer(std::move(it), {});
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if (cert)
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results.push_back(std::move(cert));
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}
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return results;
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}
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scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CloneWithDifferentIntermediates(
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std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates) {
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// If intermediates are the same, return another reference to the same
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// object. Note that this only does a pointer equality comparison on the
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// CRYPTO_BUFFERs, which is generally sufficient, but in some edge cases
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// buffers have equal contents but with different addresses. This is
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// acceptable as this is just an optimization.
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if (intermediates == intermediate_ca_certs_) {
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return this;
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}
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return base::WrapRefCounted(
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new X509Certificate(*this, std::move(intermediates)));
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}
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void X509Certificate::Persist(base::Pickle* pickle) const {
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DCHECK(cert_buffer_);
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// This would be an absolutely insane number of intermediates.
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if (intermediate_ca_certs_.size() > static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX) - 1) {
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NOTREACHED_IN_MIGRATION();
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return;
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}
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pickle->WriteInt(static_cast<int>(intermediate_ca_certs_.size() + 1));
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pickle->WriteString(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(cert_buffer_.get()));
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for (const auto& intermediate : intermediate_ca_certs_) {
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pickle->WriteString(
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x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(intermediate.get()));
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}
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}
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bool X509Certificate::GetSubjectAltName(
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std::vector<std::string>* dns_names,
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std::vector<std::string>* ip_addrs) const {
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if (dns_names)
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dns_names->clear();
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if (ip_addrs)
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ip_addrs->clear();
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bssl::der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv;
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bssl::der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv;
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bssl::der::BitString signature_value;
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if (!bssl::ParseCertificate(bssl::der::Input(cert_span()),
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&tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv,
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&signature_value, nullptr)) {
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return false;
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}
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bssl::ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
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if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv,
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x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs,
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nullptr))
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return false;
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if (!tbs.extensions_tlv)
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return false;
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std::map<bssl::der::Input, bssl::ParsedExtension> extensions;
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if (!ParseExtensions(tbs.extensions_tlv.value(), &extensions))
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return false;
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bssl::ParsedExtension subject_alt_names_extension;
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if (!ConsumeExtension(bssl::der::Input(bssl::kSubjectAltNameOid), &extensions,
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&subject_alt_names_extension)) {
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return false;
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}
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bssl::CertErrors errors;
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std::unique_ptr<bssl::GeneralNames> subject_alt_names =
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bssl::GeneralNames::Create(subject_alt_names_extension.value, &errors);
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if (!subject_alt_names)
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return false;
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if (dns_names) {
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for (const auto& dns_name : subject_alt_names->dns_names)
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dns_names->push_back(std::string(dns_name));
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}
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if (ip_addrs) {
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for (const auto& addr : subject_alt_names->ip_addresses) {
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ip_addrs->push_back(std::string(addr.AsStringView()));
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}
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}
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return !subject_alt_names->dns_names.empty() ||
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!subject_alt_names->ip_addresses.empty();
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}
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bool X509Certificate::HasExpired() const {
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return base::Time::Now() > valid_expiry();
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}
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bool X509Certificate::EqualsExcludingChain(const X509Certificate* other) const {
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return x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(cert_buffer_.get(),
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other->cert_buffer_.get());
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}
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bool X509Certificate::EqualsIncludingChain(const X509Certificate* other) const {
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if (intermediate_ca_certs_.size() != other->intermediate_ca_certs_.size() ||
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!EqualsExcludingChain(other)) {
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return false;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediate_ca_certs_.size(); ++i) {
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if (!x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(intermediate_ca_certs_[i].get(),
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other->intermediate_ca_certs_[i].get())) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool X509Certificate::IsIssuedByEncoded(
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const std::vector<std::string>& valid_issuers) const {
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std::vector<std::string> normalized_issuers;
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bssl::CertErrors errors;
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for (const auto& raw_issuer : valid_issuers) {
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bssl::der::Input issuer_value;
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std::string normalized_issuer;
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if (!ParseSequenceValue(bssl::der::Input(raw_issuer), &issuer_value) ||
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!NormalizeName(issuer_value, &normalized_issuer, &errors)) {
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continue;
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}
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normalized_issuers.push_back(std::move(normalized_issuer));
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}
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std::string normalized_cert_issuer;
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if (!GetNormalizedCertIssuer(cert_buffer_.get(), &normalized_cert_issuer))
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return false;
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if (base::Contains(normalized_issuers, normalized_cert_issuer))
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return true;
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for (const auto& intermediate : intermediate_ca_certs_) {
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if (!GetNormalizedCertIssuer(intermediate.get(), &normalized_cert_issuer))
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return false;
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if (base::Contains(normalized_issuers, normalized_cert_issuer))
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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// static
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bool X509Certificate::VerifyHostname(
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std::string_view hostname,
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const std::vector<std::string>& cert_san_dns_names,
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const std::vector<std::string>& cert_san_ip_addrs) {
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DCHECK(!hostname.empty());
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if (cert_san_dns_names.empty() && cert_san_ip_addrs.empty()) {
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// Either a dNSName or iPAddress subjectAltName MUST be present in order
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// to match, so fail quickly if not.
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return false;
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}
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// Perform name verification following http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125.
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// The terminology used in this method is as per that RFC:-
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// Reference identifier == the host the local user/agent is intending to
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// access, i.e. the thing displayed in the URL bar.
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// Presented identifier(s) == name(s) the server knows itself as, in its cert.
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// CanonicalizeHost requires surrounding brackets to parse an IPv6 address.
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const std::string host_or_ip = hostname.find(':') != std::string::npos
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? base::StrCat({"[", hostname, "]"})
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: std::string(hostname);
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url::CanonHostInfo host_info;
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std::string reference_name = CanonicalizeHost(host_or_ip, &host_info);
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// If the host cannot be canonicalized, fail fast.
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if (reference_name.empty())
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return false;
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|
|
// Fully handle all cases where |hostname| contains an IP address.
|
|
if (host_info.IsIPAddress()) {
|
|
std::string_view ip_addr_string(
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(host_info.address),
|
|
host_info.AddressLength());
|
|
return base::Contains(cert_san_ip_addrs, ip_addr_string);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The host portion of a URL may support a variety of name resolution formats
|
|
// and services. However, the only supported name types in this code are IP
|
|
// addresses, which have been handled above via iPAddress subjectAltNames,
|
|
// and DNS names, via dNSName subjectAltNames.
|
|
// Validate that the host conforms to the DNS preferred name syntax, in
|
|
// either relative or absolute form, and exclude the "root" label for DNS.
|
|
if (reference_name == "." || !IsCanonicalizedHostCompliant(reference_name))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
// CanonicalizeHost does not normalize absolute vs relative DNS names. If
|
|
// the input name was absolute (included trailing .), normalize it as if it
|
|
// was relative.
|
|
if (reference_name.back() == '.')
|
|
reference_name.pop_back();
|
|
|
|
// |reference_domain| is the remainder of |host| after the leading host
|
|
// component is stripped off, but includes the leading dot e.g.
|
|
// "www.f.com" -> ".f.com".
|
|
// If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no dots)
|
|
// then |reference_domain| will be empty.
|
|
std::string_view reference_host, reference_domain;
|
|
SplitOnChar(reference_name, '.', &reference_host, &reference_domain);
|
|
bool allow_wildcards = false;
|
|
if (!reference_domain.empty()) {
|
|
DCHECK(reference_domain.starts_with("."));
|
|
|
|
// Do not allow wildcards for public/ICANN registry controlled domains -
|
|
// that is, prevent *.com or *.co.uk as valid presented names, but do not
|
|
// prevent *.appspot.com (a private registry controlled domain).
|
|
// In addition, unknown top-level domains (such as 'intranet' domains or
|
|
// new TLDs/gTLDs not yet added to the registry controlled domain dataset)
|
|
// are also implicitly prevented.
|
|
// Because |reference_domain| must contain at least one name component that
|
|
// is not registry controlled, this ensures that all reference domains
|
|
// contain at least three domain components when using wildcards.
|
|
size_t registry_length =
|
|
registry_controlled_domains::GetCanonicalHostRegistryLength(
|
|
reference_name,
|
|
registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
|
|
registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
|
|
|
|
// Because |reference_name| was already canonicalized, the following
|
|
// should never happen.
|
|
CHECK_NE(std::string::npos, registry_length);
|
|
|
|
// Account for the leading dot in |reference_domain|.
|
|
bool is_registry_controlled =
|
|
registry_length != 0 &&
|
|
registry_length == (reference_domain.size() - 1);
|
|
|
|
// Additionally, do not attempt wildcard matching for purely numeric
|
|
// hostnames.
|
|
allow_wildcards =
|
|
!is_registry_controlled &&
|
|
reference_name.find_first_not_of("0123456789.") != std::string::npos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Now step through the DNS names doing wild card comparison (if necessary)
|
|
// on each against the reference name.
|
|
for (const auto& cert_san_dns_name : cert_san_dns_names) {
|
|
// Catch badly corrupt cert names up front.
|
|
if (cert_san_dns_name.empty() ||
|
|
cert_san_dns_name.find('\0') != std::string::npos) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
std::string presented_name(base::ToLowerASCII(cert_san_dns_name));
|
|
|
|
// Remove trailing dot, if any.
|
|
if (*presented_name.rbegin() == '.')
|
|
presented_name.resize(presented_name.length() - 1);
|
|
|
|
// The hostname must be at least as long as the cert name it is matching,
|
|
// as we require the wildcard (if present) to match at least one character.
|
|
if (presented_name.length() > reference_name.length())
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
std::string_view presented_host, presented_domain;
|
|
SplitOnChar(presented_name, '.', &presented_host, &presented_domain);
|
|
|
|
if (presented_domain != reference_domain)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (presented_host != "*") {
|
|
if (presented_host == reference_host)
|
|
return true;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!allow_wildcards)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool X509Certificate::VerifyNameMatch(std::string_view hostname) const {
|
|
std::vector<std::string> dns_names, ip_addrs;
|
|
GetSubjectAltName(&dns_names, &ip_addrs);
|
|
return VerifyHostname(hostname, dns_names, ip_addrs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
bool X509Certificate::GetPEMEncodedFromDER(std::string_view der_encoded,
|
|
std::string* pem_encoded) {
|
|
if (der_encoded.empty())
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
*pem_encoded = bssl::PEMEncode(der_encoded, "CERTIFICATE");
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
bool X509Certificate::GetPEMEncoded(const CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert_buffer,
|
|
std::string* pem_encoded) {
|
|
return GetPEMEncodedFromDER(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(cert_buffer),
|
|
pem_encoded);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool X509Certificate::GetPEMEncodedChain(
|
|
std::vector<std::string>* pem_encoded) const {
|
|
std::vector<std::string> encoded_chain;
|
|
std::string pem_data;
|
|
if (!GetPEMEncoded(cert_buffer(), &pem_data))
|
|
return false;
|
|
encoded_chain.push_back(pem_data);
|
|
for (const auto& intermediate_ca_cert : intermediate_ca_certs_) {
|
|
if (!GetPEMEncoded(intermediate_ca_cert.get(), &pem_data))
|
|
return false;
|
|
encoded_chain.push_back(pem_data);
|
|
}
|
|
pem_encoded->swap(encoded_chain);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
void X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(const CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert_buffer,
|
|
size_t* size_bits,
|
|
PublicKeyType* type) {
|
|
*type = kPublicKeyTypeUnknown;
|
|
*size_bits = 0;
|
|
|
|
std::string_view spki;
|
|
if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(
|
|
x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(cert_buffer), &spki)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey;
|
|
crypto::OpenSSLErrStackTracer err_tracer(FROM_HERE);
|
|
CBS cbs;
|
|
CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(spki.data()), spki.size());
|
|
pkey.reset(EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs));
|
|
if (!pkey)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey.get())) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
*type = kPublicKeyTypeRSA;
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
|
|
*type = kPublicKeyTypeECDSA;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
*size_bits = base::saturated_cast<size_t>(EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey.get()));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>>
|
|
X509Certificate::CreateCertBuffersFromBytes(base::span<const uint8_t> data,
|
|
Format format) {
|
|
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> results;
|
|
|
|
switch (format) {
|
|
case FORMAT_SINGLE_CERTIFICATE: {
|
|
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> handle =
|
|
CreateCertBufferFromBytesWithSanityCheck(data);
|
|
if (handle)
|
|
results.push_back(std::move(handle));
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case FORMAT_PKCS7: {
|
|
x509_util::CreateCertBuffersFromPKCS7Bytes(data, &results);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
default: {
|
|
NOTREACHED_IN_MIGRATION()
|
|
<< "Certificate format " << format << " unimplemented";
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return results;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
SHA256HashValue X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(
|
|
const CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert) {
|
|
SHA256HashValue sha256;
|
|
|
|
SHA256(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert), sha256.data);
|
|
return sha256;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SHA256HashValue X509Certificate::CalculateChainFingerprint256() const {
|
|
SHA256HashValue sha256;
|
|
memset(sha256.data, 0, sizeof(sha256.data));
|
|
|
|
SHA256_CTX sha256_ctx;
|
|
SHA256_Init(&sha256_ctx);
|
|
SHA256_Update(&sha256_ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buffer_.get()),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buffer_.get()));
|
|
for (const auto& cert : intermediate_ca_certs_) {
|
|
SHA256_Update(&sha256_ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert.get()),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert.get()));
|
|
}
|
|
SHA256_Final(sha256.data, &sha256_ctx);
|
|
|
|
return sha256;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// static
|
|
bool X509Certificate::IsSelfSigned(CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert_buffer) {
|
|
std::shared_ptr<const bssl::ParsedCertificate> parsed_cert =
|
|
bssl::ParsedCertificate::Create(
|
|
bssl::UpRef(cert_buffer), x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(),
|
|
/*errors=*/nullptr);
|
|
if (!parsed_cert) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return VerifyCertificateIsSelfSigned(*parsed_cert, /*cache=*/nullptr,
|
|
/*errors=*/nullptr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509Certificate::X509Certificate(
|
|
ParsedFields parsed,
|
|
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> cert_buffer,
|
|
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates)
|
|
: parsed_(std::move(parsed)),
|
|
cert_buffer_(std::move(cert_buffer)),
|
|
intermediate_ca_certs_(std::move(intermediates)) {}
|
|
|
|
X509Certificate::X509Certificate(
|
|
const X509Certificate& other,
|
|
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates)
|
|
: parsed_(other.parsed_),
|
|
cert_buffer_(bssl::UpRef(other.cert_buffer_)),
|
|
intermediate_ca_certs_(std::move(intermediates)) {}
|
|
|
|
X509Certificate::~X509Certificate() = default;
|
|
|
|
base::span<const uint8_t> X509Certificate::cert_span() const {
|
|
return x509_util::CryptoBufferAsSpan(cert_buffer_.get());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509Certificate::ParsedFields::ParsedFields() = default;
|
|
X509Certificate::ParsedFields::ParsedFields(const ParsedFields&) = default;
|
|
X509Certificate::ParsedFields::ParsedFields(ParsedFields&&) = default;
|
|
X509Certificate::ParsedFields::~ParsedFields() = default;
|
|
|
|
bool X509Certificate::ParsedFields::Initialize(
|
|
const CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert_buffer,
|
|
X509Certificate::UnsafeCreateOptions options) {
|
|
bssl::der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv;
|
|
bssl::der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv;
|
|
bssl::der::BitString signature_value;
|
|
|
|
if (!bssl::ParseCertificate(
|
|
bssl::der::Input(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsSpan(cert_buffer)),
|
|
&tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv, &signature_value,
|
|
nullptr)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bssl::ParsedTbsCertificate tbs;
|
|
if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv,
|
|
x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs,
|
|
nullptr))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
CertPrincipal::PrintableStringHandling printable_string_handling =
|
|
options.printable_string_is_utf8
|
|
? CertPrincipal::PrintableStringHandling::kAsUTF8Hack
|
|
: CertPrincipal::PrintableStringHandling::kDefault;
|
|
if (!subject_.ParseDistinguishedName(tbs.subject_tlv,
|
|
printable_string_handling) ||
|
|
!issuer_.ParseDistinguishedName(tbs.issuer_tlv,
|
|
printable_string_handling)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!GeneralizedTimeToTime(tbs.validity_not_before, &valid_start_) ||
|
|
!GeneralizedTimeToTime(tbs.validity_not_after, &valid_expiry_)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
serial_number_ = tbs.serial_number.AsString();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace net
|