// Copyright 2015 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #ifndef NET_CERT_INTERNAL_PARSE_CERTIFICATE_H_ #define NET_CERT_INTERNAL_PARSE_CERTIFICATE_H_ #include #include #include #include #include "base/compiler_specific.h" #include "net/base/net_export.h" #include "net/der/input.h" #include "net/der/parse_values.h" namespace net { class CertErrors; struct ParsedTbsCertificate; // Returns true if the given serial number (CertificateSerialNumber in RFC 5280) // is valid: // // CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER // // The input to this function is the (unverified) value octets of the INTEGER. // This function will verify that: // // * The octets are a valid DER-encoding of an INTEGER (for instance, minimal // encoding length). // // * No more than 20 octets are used. // // Note that it DOES NOT reject non-positive values (zero or negative). // // For reference, here is what RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.2 says: // // Given the uniqueness requirements above, serial numbers can be // expected to contain long integers. Certificate users MUST be able to // handle serialNumber values up to 20 octets. Conforming CAs MUST NOT // use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets. // // Note: Non-conforming CAs may issue certificates with serial numbers // that are negative or zero. Certificate users SHOULD be prepared to // gracefully handle such certificates. // // |errors| must be a non-null destination for any errors/warnings. If // |warnings_only| is set to true, then what would ordinarily be errors are // instead added as warnings. NET_EXPORT bool VerifySerialNumber(const der::Input& value, bool warnings_only, CertErrors* errors) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; struct NET_EXPORT ParseCertificateOptions { // If set to true, then parsing will skip checks on the certificate's serial // number. The only requirement will be that the serial number is an INTEGER, // however it is not required to be a valid DER-encoding (i.e. minimal // encoding), nor is it required to be constrained to any particular length. bool allow_invalid_serial_numbers = false; }; // Parses a DER-encoded "Certificate" as specified by RFC 5280. Returns true on // success and sets the results in the |out_*| parameters. On both the failure // and success case, if |out_errors| was non-null it may contain extra error // information. // // Note that on success the out parameters alias data from the input // |certificate_tlv|. Hence the output values are only valid as long as // |certificate_tlv| remains valid. // // On failure the out parameters have an undefined state, except for // out_errors. Some of them may have been updated during parsing, whereas // others may not have been changed. // // The out parameters represent each field of the Certificate SEQUENCE: // Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { // // The |out_tbs_certificate_tlv| parameter corresponds with "tbsCertificate" // from RFC 5280: // tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, // // This contains the full (unverified) Tag-Length-Value for a SEQUENCE. No // guarantees are made regarding the value of this SEQUENCE. // This can be further parsed using ParseTbsCertificate(). // // The |out_signature_algorithm_tlv| parameter corresponds with // "signatureAlgorithm" from RFC 5280: // signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, // // This contains the full (unverified) Tag-Length-Value for a SEQUENCE. No // guarantees are made regarding the value of this SEQUENCE. // This can be further parsed using SignatureValue::Create(). // // The |out_signature_value| parameter corresponds with "signatureValue" from // RFC 5280: // signatureValue BIT STRING } // // Parsing guarantees that this is a valid BIT STRING. NET_EXPORT bool ParseCertificate(const der::Input& certificate_tlv, der::Input* out_tbs_certificate_tlv, der::Input* out_signature_algorithm_tlv, der::BitString* out_signature_value, CertErrors* out_errors) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; // Parses a DER-encoded "TBSCertificate" as specified by RFC 5280. Returns true // on success and sets the results in |out|. Certain invalid inputs may // be accepted based on the provided |options|. // // If |errors| was non-null then any warnings/errors that occur during parsing // are added to it. // // Note that on success |out| aliases data from the input |tbs_tlv|. // Hence the fields of the ParsedTbsCertificate are only valid as long as // |tbs_tlv| remains valid. // // On failure |out| has an undefined state. Some of its fields may have been // updated during parsing, whereas others may not have been changed. // // Refer to the per-field documentation of ParsedTbsCertificate for details on // what validity checks parsing performs. // // TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { // version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, // serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, // signature AlgorithmIdentifier, // issuer Name, // validity Validity, // subject Name, // subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, // issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, // -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 // subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, // -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 // extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL // -- If present, version MUST be v3 // } NET_EXPORT bool ParseTbsCertificate(const der::Input& tbs_tlv, const ParseCertificateOptions& options, ParsedTbsCertificate* out, CertErrors* errors) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; // Represents a "Version" from RFC 5280: // Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } enum class CertificateVersion { V1, V2, V3, }; // ParsedTbsCertificate contains pointers to the main fields of a DER-encoded // RFC 5280 "TBSCertificate". // // ParsedTbsCertificate is expected to be filled by ParseTbsCertificate(), so // subsequent field descriptions are in terms of what ParseTbsCertificate() // sets. struct NET_EXPORT ParsedTbsCertificate { ParsedTbsCertificate(); ~ParsedTbsCertificate(); // Corresponds with "version" from RFC 5280: // version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, // // Parsing guarantees that the version is one of v1, v2, or v3. CertificateVersion version = CertificateVersion::V1; // Corresponds with "serialNumber" from RFC 5280: // serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, // // This field specifically contains the content bytes of the INTEGER. So for // instance if the serial number was 1000 then this would contain bytes // {0x03, 0xE8}. // // The serial number may or may not be a valid DER-encoded INTEGER: // // If the option |allow_invalid_serial_numbers=true| was used during // parsing, then nothing further can be assumed about these bytes. // // Otherwise if |allow_invalid_serial_numbers=false| then in addition // to being a valid DER-encoded INTEGER, parsing guarantees that // the serial number is at most 20 bytes long. Parsing does NOT guarantee // that the integer is positive (might be zero or negative). der::Input serial_number; // Corresponds with "signatureAlgorithm" from RFC 5280: // signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, // // This contains the full (unverified) Tag-Length-Value for a SEQUENCE. No // guarantees are made regarding the value of this SEQUENCE. // // This can be further parsed using SignatureValue::Create(). der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv; // Corresponds with "issuer" from RFC 5280: // issuer Name, // // This contains the full (unverified) Tag-Length-Value for a SEQUENCE. No // guarantees are made regarding the value of this SEQUENCE. der::Input issuer_tlv; // Corresponds with "validity" from RFC 5280: // validity Validity, // // Where Validity is defined as: // // Validity ::= SEQUENCE { // notBefore Time, // notAfter Time } // // Parsing guarantees that notBefore (validity_not_before) and notAfter // (validity_not_after) are valid DER-encoded dates, however it DOES NOT // gurantee anything about their values. For instance notAfter could be // before notBefore, or the dates could indicate an expired certificate. // Consumers are responsible for testing expiration. der::GeneralizedTime validity_not_before; der::GeneralizedTime validity_not_after; // Corresponds with "subject" from RFC 5280: // subject Name, // // This contains the full (unverified) Tag-Length-Value for a SEQUENCE. No // guarantees are made regarding the value of this SEQUENCE. der::Input subject_tlv; // Corresponds with "subjectPublicKeyInfo" from RFC 5280: // subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, // // This contains the full (unverified) Tag-Length-Value for a SEQUENCE. No // guarantees are made regarding the value of this SEQUENCE. der::Input spki_tlv; // Corresponds with "issuerUniqueID" from RFC 5280: // issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, // -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 // // Parsing guarantees that if issuer_unique_id is present it is a valid BIT // STRING, and that the version is either v2 or v3 bool has_issuer_unique_id = false; der::BitString issuer_unique_id; // Corresponds with "subjectUniqueID" from RFC 5280: // subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, // -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3 // // Parsing guarantees that if subject_unique_id is present it is a valid BIT // STRING, and that the version is either v2 or v3 bool has_subject_unique_id = false; der::BitString subject_unique_id; // Corresponds with "extensions" from RFC 5280: // extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL // -- If present, version MUST be v3 // // // This contains the full (unverified) Tag-Length-Value for a SEQUENCE. No // guarantees are made regarding the value of this SEQUENCE. (Note that the // EXPLICIT outer tag is stripped.) // // Parsing guarantees that if extensions is present the version is v3. bool has_extensions = false; der::Input extensions_tlv; }; // ParsedExtension represents a parsed "Extension" from RFC 5280. It contains // der:Inputs which are not owned so the associated data must be kept alive. // // Extension ::= SEQUENCE { // extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, // critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, // extnValue OCTET STRING // -- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value // -- corresponding to the extension type identified // -- by extnID // } struct NET_EXPORT ParsedExtension { der::Input oid; // |value| will contain the contents of the OCTET STRING. For instance for // basicConstraints it will be the TLV for a SEQUENCE. der::Input value; bool critical = false; }; // Parses a DER-encoded "Extension" as specified by RFC 5280. Returns true on // success and sets the results in |out|. // // Note that on success |out| aliases data from the input |extension_tlv|. // Hence the fields of the ParsedExtension are only valid as long as // |extension_tlv| remains valid. // // On failure |out| has an undefined state. Some of its fields may have been // updated during parsing, whereas others may not have been changed. NET_EXPORT bool ParseExtension(const der::Input& extension_tlv, ParsedExtension* out) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; // From RFC 5280: // // id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } // // In dotted notation: 2.5.29.15 NET_EXPORT der::Input KeyUsageOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } // // In dotted notation: 2.5.29.17 NET_EXPORT der::Input SubjectAltNameOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } // // In dotted notation: 2.5.29.19 NET_EXPORT der::Input BasicConstraintsOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } // // In dotted notation: 2.5.29.30 NET_EXPORT der::Input NameConstraintsOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } // // In dotted notation: 2.5.29.32 NET_EXPORT der::Input CertificatePoliciesOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } // // In dotted notation: 2.5.29.36 NET_EXPORT der::Input PolicyConstraintsOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 } // // In dotted notation: 2.5.29.37 NET_EXPORT der::Input ExtKeyUsageOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 } // // In dotted notation: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 NET_EXPORT der::Input AuthorityInfoAccessOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 } // // In dotted notation: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 NET_EXPORT der::Input AdCaIssuersOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 } // // In dotted notation: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 NET_EXPORT der::Input AdOcspOid(); // From RFC 5280: // // id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 } // // In dotted notation: 2.5.29.31 NET_EXPORT der::Input CrlDistributionPointsOid(); // Parses the Extensions sequence as defined by RFC 5280. Extensions are added // to the map |extensions| keyed by the OID. Parsing guarantees that each OID // is unique. Note that certificate verification must consume each extension // marked as critical. // // Returns true on success and fills |extensions|. The output will reference // bytes in |extensions_tlv|, so that data must be kept alive. // On failure |extensions| may be partially written to and should not be used. NET_EXPORT bool ParseExtensions( const der::Input& extensions_tlv, std::map* extensions) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; // Removes the extension with OID |oid| from |unconsumed_extensions| and fills // |extension| with the matching extension value. If there was no extension // matching |oid| then returns |false|. NET_EXPORT bool ConsumeExtension( const der::Input& oid, std::map* unconsumed_extensions, ParsedExtension* extension) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; struct ParsedBasicConstraints { bool is_ca = false; bool has_path_len = false; uint8_t path_len = 0; }; // Parses the BasicConstraints extension as defined by RFC 5280: // // BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { // cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, // pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } // // The maximum allowed value of pathLenConstraints will be whatever can fit // into a uint8_t. NET_EXPORT bool ParseBasicConstraints(const der::Input& basic_constraints_tlv, ParsedBasicConstraints* out) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; // KeyUsageBit contains the index for a particular key usage. The index is // measured from the most significant bit of a bit string. // // From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3: // // KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING { // digitalSignature (0), // nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have // -- renamed this bit to contentCommitment // keyEncipherment (2), // dataEncipherment (3), // keyAgreement (4), // keyCertSign (5), // cRLSign (6), // encipherOnly (7), // decipherOnly (8) } enum KeyUsageBit { KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE = 0, KEY_USAGE_BIT_NON_REPUDIATION = 1, KEY_USAGE_BIT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT = 2, KEY_USAGE_BIT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT = 3, KEY_USAGE_BIT_KEY_AGREEMENT = 4, KEY_USAGE_BIT_KEY_CERT_SIGN = 5, KEY_USAGE_BIT_CRL_SIGN = 6, KEY_USAGE_BIT_ENCIPHER_ONLY = 7, KEY_USAGE_BIT_DECIPHER_ONLY = 8, }; // Parses the KeyUsage extension as defined by RFC 5280. Returns true on // success, and |key_usage| will alias data in |key_usage_tlv|. On failure // returns false, and |key_usage| may have been modified. // // In addition to validating that key_usage_tlv is a BIT STRING, this does // additional KeyUsage specific validations such as requiring at least 1 bit to // be set. // // To test if a particular key usage is set, call, e.g.: // key_usage->AssertsBit(KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE); NET_EXPORT bool ParseKeyUsage(const der::Input& key_usage_tlv, der::BitString* key_usage) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; // Parses the Authority Information Access extension defined by RFC 5280. // Returns true on success, and |out_ca_issuers_uris| and |out_ocsp_uris| will // alias data in |authority_info_access_tlv|. On failure returns false, and // |out_ca_issuers_uris| and |out_ocsp_uris| may have been partially filled. // // |out_ca_issuers_uris| is filled with the accessLocations of type // uniformResourceIdentifier for the accessMethod id-ad-caIssuers. // |out_ocsp_uris| is filled with the accessLocations of type // uniformResourceIdentifier for the accessMethod id-ad-ocsp. // // The values in |out_ca_issuers_uris| and |out_ocsp_uris| are checked to be // IA5String (ASCII strings), but no other validation is performed on them. // // accessMethods other than id-ad-caIssuers and id-ad-ocsp are silently ignored. // accessLocation types other than uniformResourceIdentifier are silently // ignored. NET_EXPORT bool ParseAuthorityInfoAccess( const der::Input& authority_info_access_tlv, std::vector* out_ca_issuers_uris, std::vector* out_ocsp_uris) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; // ParsedDistributionPoint represents a parsed DistributionPoint from RFC 5280. // It is simplified compared to that from RFC 5280 as it make assumptions about // which OPTIONAL fields are present, and which CHOICEs are used. // // DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { // distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, // reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, // cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } struct NET_EXPORT ParsedDistributionPoint { ParsedDistributionPoint(); ParsedDistributionPoint(ParsedDistributionPoint&& other); ~ParsedDistributionPoint(); // The possibly-empty list of URIs from distributionPoint. std::vector uris; // TODO(eroman): Include the actual cRLIssuer. bool has_crl_issuer = false; }; // Parses the value of a CRL Distribution Points extension (sequence of // DistributionPoint). Return true on success, and fills |distribution_points| // with values that reference data in |distribution_points_tlv|. // // Some simplifications are made during parsing. // // * Skips DistributionPoints that lack a "distributionPoint" (name) field. // // * Skips DistributionPoints that contain a "reasons" field. This is // reasonable under RFC 5280's profile which requires that conforming CAs // "MUST include at least one DistributionPoint that points to a CRL that // covers the certificate for all reasons". // // * Only parses URIs from the GeneralNames "distributionPoint". If the // DistributionPoint uses "nameRelativeToCRLIssuer" rather than "fullName" it // is skipped. And if "fullName" includes names ofther than // "uniformResourceIdentifier" they are also skipped. NET_EXPORT bool ParseCrlDistributionPoints( const der::Input& distribution_points_tlv, std::vector* distribution_points) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; } // namespace net #endif // NET_CERT_INTERNAL_PARSE_CERTIFICATE_H_