// Copyright 2015 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "net/cert/internal/name_constraints.h" #include #include #include "base/logging.h" #include "base/strings/string_util.h" #include "net/cert/internal/cert_errors.h" #include "net/cert/internal/verify_name_match.h" #include "net/der/input.h" #include "net/der/parser.h" #include "net/der/tag.h" namespace net { namespace { // The name types of GeneralName that are fully supported in name constraints. // // (The other types will have the minimal checking described by RFC 5280 // section 4.2.1.10: If a name constraints extension that is marked as critical // imposes constraints on a particular name form, and an instance of // that name form appears in the subject field or subjectAltName // extension of a subsequent certificate, then the application MUST // either process the constraint or reject the certificate.) const int kSupportedNameTypes = GENERAL_NAME_DNS_NAME | GENERAL_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME | GENERAL_NAME_IP_ADDRESS; // Controls wildcard handling of DNSNameMatches. // If WildcardMatchType is WILDCARD_PARTIAL_MATCH "*.bar.com" is considered to // match the constraint "foo.bar.com". If it is WILDCARD_FULL_MATCH, "*.bar.com" // will match "bar.com" but not "foo.bar.com". enum WildcardMatchType { WILDCARD_PARTIAL_MATCH, WILDCARD_FULL_MATCH }; // Returns true if |name| falls in the subtree defined by |dns_constraint|. // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10: // DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS // name that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels // to the left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For // example, www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but // host1.example.com would not. // // |wildcard_matching| controls handling of wildcard names (|name| starts with // "*."). Wildcard handling is not specified by RFC 5280, but certificate // verification allows it, name constraints must check it similarly. bool DNSNameMatches(base::StringPiece name, base::StringPiece dns_constraint, WildcardMatchType wildcard_matching) { // Everything matches the empty DNS name constraint. if (dns_constraint.empty()) return true; // Normalize absolute DNS names by removing the trailing dot, if any. if (!name.empty() && *name.rbegin() == '.') name.remove_suffix(1); if (!dns_constraint.empty() && *dns_constraint.rbegin() == '.') dns_constraint.remove_suffix(1); // Wildcard partial-match handling ("*.bar.com" matching name constraint // "foo.bar.com"). This only handles the case where the the dnsname and the // constraint match after removing the leftmost label, otherwise it is handled // by falling through to the check of whether the dnsname is fully within or // fully outside of the constraint. if (wildcard_matching == WILDCARD_PARTIAL_MATCH && name.size() > 2 && name[0] == '*' && name[1] == '.') { size_t dns_constraint_dot_pos = dns_constraint.find('.'); if (dns_constraint_dot_pos != std::string::npos) { base::StringPiece dns_constraint_domain( dns_constraint.begin() + dns_constraint_dot_pos + 1, dns_constraint.size() - dns_constraint_dot_pos - 1); base::StringPiece wildcard_domain(name.begin() + 2, name.size() - 2); if (base::EqualsCaseInsensitiveASCII(wildcard_domain, dns_constraint_domain)) { return true; } } } if (!base::EndsWith(name, dns_constraint, base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) { return false; } // Exact match. if (name.size() == dns_constraint.size()) return true; // If dNSName constraint starts with a dot, only subdomains should match. // (e.g., "foo.bar.com" matches constraint ".bar.com", but "bar.com" doesn't.) // RFC 5280 is ambiguous, but this matches the behavior of other platforms. if (!dns_constraint.empty() && dns_constraint[0] == '.') dns_constraint.remove_prefix(1); // Subtree match. if (name.size() > dns_constraint.size() && name[name.size() - dns_constraint.size() - 1] == '.') { return true; } // Trailing text matches, but not in a subtree (e.g., "foobar.com" is not a // match for "bar.com"). return false; } // Parses a GeneralSubtrees |value| and store the contents in |subtrees|. // The individual values stored into |subtrees| are not validated by this // function. // NOTE: |subtrees| is not pre-initialized by the function(it is expected to be // a default initialized object), and it will be modified regardless of the // return value. WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool ParseGeneralSubtrees(const der::Input& value, GeneralNames* subtrees, CertErrors* errors) { DCHECK(errors); // GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree // // GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { // base GeneralName, // minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, // maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } // // BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) der::Parser sequence_parser(value); // The GeneralSubtrees sequence should have at least 1 element. if (!sequence_parser.HasMore()) return false; while (sequence_parser.HasMore()) { der::Parser subtree_sequence; if (!sequence_parser.ReadSequence(&subtree_sequence)) return false; der::Input raw_general_name; if (!subtree_sequence.ReadRawTLV(&raw_general_name)) return false; if (!ParseGeneralName( raw_general_name, GeneralNames::IP_ADDRESS_AND_NETMASK, subtrees, errors)) { errors->AddError(kFailedParsingGeneralName); return false; } // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10: // Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with any // name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be absent. // However, if an application encounters a critical name constraints // extension that specifies other values for minimum or maximum for a name // form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the application MUST // either process these fields or reject the certificate. // Note that technically failing here isn't required: rather only need to // fail if a name of this type actually appears in a subsequent cert and // this extension was marked critical. However the minimum and maximum // fields appear uncommon enough that implementing that isn't useful. if (subtree_sequence.HasMore()) return false; } return true; } } // namespace NameConstraints::~NameConstraints() = default; // static std::unique_ptr NameConstraints::Create( const der::Input& extension_value, bool is_critical, CertErrors* errors) { DCHECK(errors); std::unique_ptr name_constraints(new NameConstraints()); if (!name_constraints->Parse(extension_value, is_critical, errors)) return nullptr; return name_constraints; } bool NameConstraints::Parse(const der::Input& extension_value, bool is_critical, CertErrors* errors) { DCHECK(errors); der::Parser extension_parser(extension_value); der::Parser sequence_parser; // NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { // permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, // excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } if (!extension_parser.ReadSequence(&sequence_parser)) return false; if (extension_parser.HasMore()) return false; bool had_permitted_subtrees = false; der::Input permitted_subtrees_value; if (!sequence_parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(0), &permitted_subtrees_value, &had_permitted_subtrees)) { return false; } if (had_permitted_subtrees && !ParseGeneralSubtrees(permitted_subtrees_value, &permitted_subtrees_, errors)) { return false; } constrained_name_types_ |= permitted_subtrees_.present_name_types & (is_critical ? GENERAL_NAME_ALL_TYPES : kSupportedNameTypes); bool had_excluded_subtrees = false; der::Input excluded_subtrees_value; if (!sequence_parser.ReadOptionalTag(der::ContextSpecificConstructed(1), &excluded_subtrees_value, &had_excluded_subtrees)) { return false; } if (had_excluded_subtrees && !ParseGeneralSubtrees(excluded_subtrees_value, &excluded_subtrees_, errors)) { return false; } constrained_name_types_ |= excluded_subtrees_.present_name_types & (is_critical ? GENERAL_NAME_ALL_TYPES : kSupportedNameTypes); // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10: // Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an // empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the // excludedSubtrees MUST be present. if (!had_permitted_subtrees && !had_excluded_subtrees) return false; if (sequence_parser.HasMore()) return false; return true; } bool NameConstraints::IsPermittedCert( const der::Input& subject_rdn_sequence, const GeneralNames* subject_alt_names) const { // Subject Alternative Name handling: // // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: // id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } // // SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames // // GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName if (subject_alt_names) { // Check unsupported name types: // constrained_name_types() for the unsupported types will only be true if // that type of name was present in a name constraint that was marked // critical. // // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10: // If a name constraints extension that is marked as critical // imposes constraints on a particular name form, and an instance of // that name form appears in the subject field or subjectAltName // extension of a subsequent certificate, then the application MUST // either process the constraint or reject the certificate. if (constrained_name_types() & subject_alt_names->present_name_types & ~kSupportedNameTypes) { return false; } // Check supported name types: for (const auto& dns_name : subject_alt_names->dns_names) { if (!IsPermittedDNSName(dns_name)) return false; } for (const auto& directory_name : subject_alt_names->directory_names) { if (!IsPermittedDirectoryName(directory_name)) return false; } for (const auto& ip_address : subject_alt_names->ip_addresses) { if (!IsPermittedIP(ip_address)) return false; } } // Subject handling: // RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10: // Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is embedded // in the subject distinguished name in an attribute of type emailAddress // (Section 4.1.2.6). When constraints are imposed on the rfc822Name name // form, but the certificate does not include a subject alternative name, the // rfc822Name constraint MUST be applied to the attribute of type emailAddress // in the subject distinguished name. if (!subject_alt_names && (constrained_name_types() & GENERAL_NAME_RFC822_NAME)) { bool contained_email_address = false; if (!NameContainsEmailAddress(subject_rdn_sequence, &contained_email_address)) { return false; } if (contained_email_address) return false; } // RFC 5280 4.1.2.6: // If subject naming information is present only in the subjectAltName // extension (e.g., a key bound only to an email address or URI), then the // subject name MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension // MUST be critical. // This code assumes that criticality condition is checked by the caller, and // therefore only needs to avoid the IsPermittedDirectoryName check against an // empty subject in such a case. if (subject_alt_names && subject_rdn_sequence.Length() == 0) return true; return IsPermittedDirectoryName(subject_rdn_sequence); } bool NameConstraints::IsPermittedDNSName(base::StringPiece name) const { for (const auto& excluded_name : excluded_subtrees_.dns_names) { // When matching wildcard hosts against excluded subtrees, consider it a // match if the constraint would match any expansion of the wildcard. Eg, // *.bar.com should match a constraint of foo.bar.com. if (DNSNameMatches(name, excluded_name, WILDCARD_PARTIAL_MATCH)) return false; } // If permitted subtrees are not constrained, any name that is not excluded is // allowed. if (!(permitted_subtrees_.present_name_types & GENERAL_NAME_DNS_NAME)) return true; for (const auto& permitted_name : permitted_subtrees_.dns_names) { // When matching wildcard hosts against permitted subtrees, consider it a // match only if the constraint would match all expansions of the wildcard. // Eg, *.bar.com should match a constraint of bar.com, but not foo.bar.com. if (DNSNameMatches(name, permitted_name, WILDCARD_FULL_MATCH)) return true; } return false; } bool NameConstraints::IsPermittedDirectoryName( const der::Input& name_rdn_sequence) const { for (const auto& excluded_name : excluded_subtrees_.directory_names) { if (VerifyNameInSubtree(name_rdn_sequence, excluded_name)) return false; } // If permitted subtrees are not constrained, any name that is not excluded is // allowed. if (!(permitted_subtrees_.present_name_types & GENERAL_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)) return true; for (const auto& permitted_name : permitted_subtrees_.directory_names) { if (VerifyNameInSubtree(name_rdn_sequence, permitted_name)) return true; } return false; } bool NameConstraints::IsPermittedIP(const IPAddress& ip) const { for (const auto& excluded_ip : excluded_subtrees_.ip_address_ranges) { if (IPAddressMatchesPrefix(ip, excluded_ip.first, excluded_ip.second)) return false; } // If permitted subtrees are not constrained, any name that is not excluded is // allowed. if (!(permitted_subtrees_.present_name_types & GENERAL_NAME_IP_ADDRESS)) return true; for (const auto& permitted_ip : permitted_subtrees_.ip_address_ranges) { if (IPAddressMatchesPrefix(ip, permitted_ip.first, permitted_ip.second)) return true; } return false; } } // namespace net