// Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be // found in the LICENSE file. #include "net/cert/multi_log_ct_verifier.h" #include #include "base/bind.h" #include "base/callback_helpers.h" #include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h" #include "base/values.h" #include "net/base/net_errors.h" #include "net/cert/ct_log_verifier.h" #include "net/cert/ct_objects_extractor.h" #include "net/cert/ct_serialization.h" #include "net/cert/ct_signed_certificate_timestamp_log_param.h" #include "net/cert/sct_status_flags.h" #include "net/cert/signed_certificate_timestamp_and_status.h" #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" #include "net/log/net_log_event_type.h" #include "net/log/net_log_parameters_callback.h" #include "net/log/net_log_with_source.h" namespace net { namespace { // Record SCT verification status. This metric would help detecting presence // of unknown CT logs as well as bad deployments (invalid SCTs). void LogSCTStatusToUMA(ct::SCTVerifyStatus status) { // Note SCT_STATUS_MAX + 1 is passed to the UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION as that // macro requires the values to be strictly less than the boundary value, // and SCT_STATUS_MAX is the last valid value of the SCTVerifyStatus enum // (since that enum is used for IPC as well). UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.CertificateTransparency.SCTStatus", status, ct::SCT_STATUS_MAX + 1); } // Record SCT origin enum. This metric measure the popularity // of the various channels of providing SCTs for a certificate. void LogSCTOriginToUMA(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin origin) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.CertificateTransparency.SCTOrigin", origin, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_ORIGIN_MAX); } // Count the number of SCTs that were available for each SSL connection // (including SCTs embedded in the certificate). // This metric would allow measuring: // * Of all SSL connections, how many had SCTs available for validation. // * When SCTs are available, how many are available per connection. void LogNumSCTsToUMA(const SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList& scts) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS("Net.CertificateTransparency.SCTsPerConnection", scts.size(), 1, 10, 11); } void AddSCTAndLogStatus(scoped_refptr sct, ct::SCTVerifyStatus status, SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList* sct_list) { LogSCTStatusToUMA(status); sct_list->push_back(SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatus(sct, status)); } } // namespace MultiLogCTVerifier::MultiLogCTVerifier() : observer_(nullptr) { } MultiLogCTVerifier::~MultiLogCTVerifier() = default; void MultiLogCTVerifier::AddLogs( const std::vector>& log_verifiers) { for (const auto& log_verifier : log_verifiers) { VLOG(1) << "Adding CT log: " << log_verifier->description(); logs_[log_verifier->key_id()] = log_verifier; } } void MultiLogCTVerifier::SetObserver(Observer* observer) { observer_ = observer; } CTVerifier::Observer* MultiLogCTVerifier::GetObserver() const { return observer_; } void MultiLogCTVerifier::Verify( base::StringPiece hostname, X509Certificate* cert, base::StringPiece stapled_ocsp_response, base::StringPiece sct_list_from_tls_extension, SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList* output_scts, const NetLogWithSource& net_log) { DCHECK(cert); DCHECK(output_scts); base::TimeTicks start = base::TimeTicks::Now(); output_scts->clear(); std::string embedded_scts; if (!cert->intermediate_buffers().empty() && ct::ExtractEmbeddedSCTList(cert->cert_buffer(), &embedded_scts)) { ct::SignedEntryData precert_entry; if (ct::GetPrecertSignedEntry(cert->cert_buffer(), cert->intermediate_buffers().front().get(), &precert_entry)) { VerifySCTs(hostname, embedded_scts, precert_entry, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, cert, output_scts); } } std::string sct_list_from_ocsp; if (!stapled_ocsp_response.empty() && !cert->intermediate_buffers().empty()) { ct::ExtractSCTListFromOCSPResponse( cert->intermediate_buffers().front().get(), cert->serial_number(), stapled_ocsp_response, &sct_list_from_ocsp); } // Log to Net Log, after extracting SCTs but before possibly failing on // X.509 entry creation. NetLogParametersCallback net_log_callback = base::Bind(&NetLogRawSignedCertificateTimestampCallback, embedded_scts, sct_list_from_ocsp, sct_list_from_tls_extension); net_log.AddEvent(NetLogEventType::SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMPS_RECEIVED, net_log_callback); ct::SignedEntryData x509_entry; if (ct::GetX509SignedEntry(cert->cert_buffer(), &x509_entry)) { VerifySCTs(hostname, sct_list_from_ocsp, x509_entry, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_OCSP_RESPONSE, cert, output_scts); VerifySCTs(hostname, sct_list_from_tls_extension, x509_entry, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_EXTENSION, cert, output_scts); } // Only log the verification time if SCTs were provided. if (!output_scts->empty()) { base::TimeDelta verify_time = base::TimeTicks::Now() - start; UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_MICROSECONDS_TIMES( "Net.CertificateTransparency.SCT.VerificationTime", verify_time, base::TimeDelta::FromMicroseconds(1), base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(100), 50); } NetLogParametersCallback net_log_checked_callback = base::Bind(&NetLogSignedCertificateTimestampCallback, output_scts); net_log.AddEvent(NetLogEventType::SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMPS_CHECKED, net_log_checked_callback); LogNumSCTsToUMA(*output_scts); } void MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySCTs( base::StringPiece hostname, base::StringPiece encoded_sct_list, const ct::SignedEntryData& expected_entry, ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin origin, X509Certificate* cert, SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList* output_scts) { if (logs_.empty()) return; std::vector sct_list; if (!ct::DecodeSCTList(encoded_sct_list, &sct_list)) return; for (std::vector::const_iterator it = sct_list.begin(); it != sct_list.end(); ++it) { base::StringPiece encoded_sct(*it); LogSCTOriginToUMA(origin); scoped_refptr decoded_sct; if (!DecodeSignedCertificateTimestamp(&encoded_sct, &decoded_sct)) { LogSCTStatusToUMA(ct::SCT_STATUS_NONE); continue; } decoded_sct->origin = origin; base::TimeTicks start = base::TimeTicks::Now(); VerifySingleSCT(hostname, decoded_sct, expected_entry, cert, output_scts); base::TimeDelta verify_time = base::TimeTicks::Now() - start; UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_MICROSECONDS_TIMES( "Net.CertificateTransparency.SCT.SingleVerificationTime", verify_time, base::TimeDelta::FromMicroseconds(1), base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(100), 50); } } bool MultiLogCTVerifier::VerifySingleSCT( base::StringPiece hostname, scoped_refptr sct, const ct::SignedEntryData& expected_entry, X509Certificate* cert, SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList* output_scts) { // Assume this SCT is untrusted until proven otherwise. const auto& it = logs_.find(sct->log_id); if (it == logs_.end()) { DVLOG(1) << "SCT does not match any known log."; AddSCTAndLogStatus(sct, ct::SCT_STATUS_LOG_UNKNOWN, output_scts); return false; } sct->log_description = it->second->description(); if (!it->second->Verify(expected_entry, *sct.get())) { DVLOG(1) << "Unable to verify SCT signature."; AddSCTAndLogStatus(sct, ct::SCT_STATUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE, output_scts); return false; } // SCT verified ok, just make sure the timestamp is legitimate. if (sct->timestamp > base::Time::Now()) { DVLOG(1) << "SCT is from the future!"; AddSCTAndLogStatus(sct, ct::SCT_STATUS_INVALID_TIMESTAMP, output_scts); return false; } AddSCTAndLogStatus(sct, ct::SCT_STATUS_OK, output_scts); if (observer_) observer_->OnSCTVerified(hostname, cert, sct.get()); return true; } } // namespace net